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ABSTRACT 
Despite rapid economic growth in recent years, Mozambique remains a very poor 
country. Expenditure-based poverty measures are reflected in widespread food insecurity 
and poor health status. In recognition of these problems, the Government of Mozambique 
is promoting expanded and improved quality and equity in access to health care as an 
important component in the global strategy to fight poverty. Given years of colonial 
neglect and systematic destruction of health facilities during the civil war, recent 
government policy has focused on expanding the rural health network. However, insofar 
as the ultimate objective of the provision of curative services is to ensure that those in 
need of care receive effective treatment, it is also necessary to think beyond supply. 
Specifically, we need to consider how individuals behave during episodes of illness, and 
what factors affect this behavior. This paper provides quantitative evidence on the 
importance of individual, household, and community characteristics on individuals’ care-
seeking decisions during episodes of illness. The paper estimates a “flexible” multinomial 
model of health care provider choice conditional on illness using data from the 1996/97 
Mozambique National Household Survey on Living Conditions (IAF). The empirical 
analysis is underpinned by a basic theoretical framework of utility maximization and 
household production of health. A number of individual and household characteristics, 
e.g., age, education, and reported symptoms, stand out as highly significant determinants 
of health seeking behavior. Also, prices, defined in the model as the composite of user 
fees and time costs associated with consultations at different providers, are found to be   iii 
important determinants of choice. The results indicate that the eradication of poverty, 
independent of improvements in physical access to health care and education, will have 
only a negligible effect on health care choices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Health is a fundamental dimension of well-being and a key component of human 
capital. Conversely, poor health and the inability to cope with episodes of illness can be 
considered important dimensions of deprivation. Health outcomes are affected by a wide 
range of factors, pertaining both to the individual and the social and environmental 
context. In addition, preventive and curative health services are direct inputs that affect 
an individual’s health status and ability to cope with ill health. For example, there is 
evidence that both the distance to clinics and the price of drugs are negatively correlated 
with health outcomes (Benefo and Schulz 1994). Of course, the link between the 
provision and health care and health outcomes can be tenuous (e.g., Filmer et al. 1998). 
Still, the World Bank (1993, 40) reports that “in the 22 countries, roughly one-third of the 
effect of economic growth on life expectancy came through poverty reduction and the 
remaining two-thirds through increased public spending on health.”  
Given the importance of health services, both policymakers and researchers have 
directed considerable attention to the question of how broad access to health services can 
be ensured. Early policy and research initiatives focused on the need to improve physical 
access through an expansion of the network of facilities.
1 A growing literature on health 
care demand has, however, pointed out that supply is not sufficient. “There is a lack of 
understanding…of why people might desire to use these new services or, similarly, why 
                                                 
1 Reflecting this focus, both the UNDP (1991) and the World Bank (1993) define access as the percentage 
of the population that can reach appropriate local health services on foot or by the local means of transport 
in no more than an hour.   2
they might stay away” (Akin et al. 1986b, 756). Actual consumption of health care will 
differ in accordance with demand factors such as income, cost of care, education, social 
norms and traditions, and the quality and appropriateness of the services provided.  
This paper adopts the notion of access used by Baker and van der Gaag (1993), 
who define access as the actual use of health services in the event of illness. Following a 
growing literature on health care demand, the paper seeks to investigate and quantify the 
determinants of access to publicly provided health care, and of health-seeking behavior 
more broadly. Specifically, the paper provides descriptive evidence on illness incidence 
and care-seeking behavior for rural households from a 1996/97 nationwide household 
survey in Mozambique. However, observed outcomes reflect a complex interaction of 
numerous factors, and they do not shed light on how different explanatory variables 
affect outcomes conditional on other variables. Only when we control for these 
complexities can we make meaningful policy inferences. The paper therefore estimates a 
behavioral model of health care demand, where demand is understood as the probability 
of seeking different types of care conditional on illness, given the relevant characteristics 
of the individual, the household, and the wider community. 
Following this introduction, Section 2 provides an overview of issues relating to 
health and health care provision in Mozambique, providing both a historical perspective 
and a discussion of the current policy framework. Section 3 describes the data that form 
the basis for the research reported in this paper. It also provides an overview of evidence 
on the incidence of illness, the decision to seek care, and the choice of health care 
provider in the event of illness, and relates this evidence to the relevant literature. Section   3
4 sets out the theoretical framework and the empirical model that underpin the analysis of 
the data, drawing extensively on the existing literature on health care demand. Section 5 
reports the results of the empirical analysis and investigates policy implications through a 
few simple policy simulations. Finally, Section 6 discusses the broader implications of 
the research. 
 
2. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE IN MOZAMBIQUE 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
General Background 
Mozambique was once a Portuguese colony. The country gained independence in 
1975, after more than 10 years of conflict between the Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique (Frelimo)
2 and the Portuguese state. After independence, Frelimo adopted 
an ambitious socialist approach to development. This entailed a broad policy of 
nationalization, beginning with the health and education sectors, but later extending to the 
legal and commercial sector, land, rented housing, banking, agriculture, and other sectors.  
Notwithstanding some notable successes, particularly in respect of social 
indicators relating to health and education, Frelimo’s policies largely failed to stimulate 
economic growth. Growing tensions between Mozambique and Rhodesia and South 
Africa compounded economic woes. In response to Frelimo’s support of independence 
movements in the two neighboring countries, Mozambique became the target of intense 
                                                 
2 Mozambique Liberation Front.   4
destabilization campaigns, largely carried out by the Resisténcia Nacional de 
Moçambique (Renamo).
3 These campaigns sought to undermine the basis of Frelimo 
popularity and brought large-scale destruction of both physical and social infrastructure. 
In recognition of the economic problems facing the country, the 1983 Fourth 
Frelimo Party Congress heralded a new emphasis on more decentralized and capitalist-
oriented development strategy. Mozambique joined the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1984, and the first adjustment program—the Economic 
Rehabilitation Programme (ERP)—was introduced in 1987. In 1990, the ERP was 
followed by the Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme (ESRP). In the same 
year, constitutional revision introduced a multi-party system and a tentative dialogue was 
initiated between the government and Renamo. A peace agreement was eventually signed 
in 1992, and the first democratic presidential and parliamentary elections followed in 
1994. Frelimo won the elections, but Renamo gained considerable minority 
representation in parliament. Structural reforms initiated in 1987 brought the deregulation 
of most goods and service markets, large-scale privatization, and a liberalization of the 
trade regime. In parallel, an ambitious program of public sector reform was formulated 
and implementation begun. 
In recent years, Mozambique has been considered an African “success story.” 
Inflation has fallen steadily to low levels, growth has been high and stable, and foreign 
investment is rising. Notwithstanding impressive macroeconomic indicators, the 
                                                 
3 Mozambique National Resistance.   5
economy remains highly aid dependent, and there is widespread concern that the gains 
from economic growth have failed to benefit the poorest segments of the population. 
 
The Health Sector 
During colonization, the health status of the majority of the population was very 
poor.
4 The Portuguese state put very little effort into social development, and with the 
exception of some vertical health programs,
5 very few or no health services were 
provided by the state outside the major towns. To the extent that health services were 
available, they were provided by church groups or traditional medical practitioners 
(TMPs). Similarly, education received little attention, and skilled and semiskilled 
employment opportunities were very limited for black Mozambicans; at independence, 
90 percent of the population was illiterate (Walt 1983).  
Soon after independence, Frelimo put all existing health facilities under 
government control and banned private practice. It also sought to redress imbalances in 
the colonial health sector by initiating a dramatic expansion of the rural health network. 
The number of first-level health posts increased from 326 at independence to 1,195 in 
1985 (van Diesen 1999). This entailed an expansion of the physical infrastructure, but 
also intensive recruitment and training.
6 Frelimo also launched an intensive vaccination 
                                                 
4 It is estimated that over one-quarter of all children died before age 5 (Walt 1983). 
5 E.g., sleeping sickness. 
6 In the uncertain environment following independence, large segments of the Portuguese population left 
the country. This exodus had a dramatic impact on the health sector: 85 percent of the country’s 550 
doctors left and most rural mission hospitals or health posts were abandoned.   6
campaign in 1976. Despite low population density and poor transport infrastructure, over 
10 million people were vaccinated in these early campaigns.
7  
Frelimo’s Third Congress in 1977 laid down guidelines for future development 
and health policy. It brought the “socialization of medicine” (Walt 1983), which sought 
to improve and broaden access to health care. Although minor charges for outpatient 
visits were maintained, exemption schemes provided for waivers. All inpatient care was 
to be free. A referral system was also set up, which established the health post as the first 
point of contact, while health centers and hospitals dealt with the more complex cases.
8 
Frelimo’s health policies suffered severely from the intensification of Renamo’s 
destabilization campaign in the early 1980s, which consistently targeted health facilities 
and schools. Between 1981 and 1988, 291 health units were destroyed and a further 687 
looted and temporarily closed. It is estimated that at the end of the war, almost half of the 
1,195 health units that existed in 1985 remained closed (van Diesen 1999). Similarly, 60 
percent of all primary schools were destroyed. A crisis in the health sector ensued. Plans 
for reconstruction and human resource development were formulated in a comprehensive 
policy review undertaken in 1991/92, which emphasized sustainability and incremental 
growth (Pavignani and Durão 1997). The conclusions of the policy review were reflected 
in the gradual reform of the legislative framework, the reintroduction of private practice, 
and the formulation of the Health Sector Recovery Programme (HSRP), a World Bank-
                                                 
7 Although the campaign has been hailed as a success, poor follow-up (including second doses of some 
vaccines) resulted in poor impact (Walt 1983). 
8 Both fee waivers and the referral system were easier to implement on paper than in practice.   7
supported sector investment program. The HSRP was launched in late 1995 with the aim 
of decreasing Mozambique’s infant, child, and maternal mortality rates to Sub-Saharan 
average levels by the turn of the century. This was to be achieved by expanding health 
coverage, particularly primary health care, from an estimated 40 percent of the population 
to 60 percent by 2000.  
The HSRP was implemented with only limited success. Since 1998 work has been 
under way to develop a long-term health sector financing strategy and strategic plan. 
Again, financial sustainability is emphasized, and institutional reform initiatives have 
been proposed with a view to strengthen the regulatory capacity of the Ministry of Health 
and to separate the functions of financing and regulating the health sector from the 
provision of services. Implementation is expected to begin in 2001.  
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 
The Government of Mozambique is responsible for providing a minimum set of 
services and for managing the National Health System (NHS). Delivery of care is 
organized into four levels of facilities: (1) health posts and health centers; (2) rural and 
general hospitals; (3) provincial hospitals; and (4) central and specialized hospitals. In 
theory, patients are referred through this system in accordance with their need. Health 
posts and centers provide only basic preventive and curative services. Health posts 
typically have only rudimentary facilities and limited staffing, while health centers have a 
number of auxiliary staff and more sophisticated equipment and facilities (there is, 
however, considerable variability). Rural and general hospitals constitute the first level of   8
referral and usually have emergency care and perform simple surgeries as well as 
obstetric and trauma interventions. Patients in need of more specialized care are 
sometimes referred to provincial or central hospitals. 
The Government’s health-sector policy emphasizes equity, access, and quality 
(see, for example, MoH 1999), and is in recognition of its strategic importance. The 
government (GoM 2000a, 41) recently noted that “expanded and improved quality and 
equity in access to health care [is] an important component in the global strategy to fight 
poverty.” Specific policies and targets for the health sector have been set out in a range of 
policy documents, including the conditionality framework for the HIPC Initiative,
9 and 
form a fundamental building block of the Government’s Interim Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (IPRSP) (GoM 2000b).
10 Key objectives are to (1) promote and provide 
good quality and sustainable health care, equitably and efficiently, making it accessible to 
the population, especially the less privileged groups; (2) increase access and improve the 
quality of health care for women; (3) improve infant and under-five health care; and 
(4) through immunization, prevent the main endemic diseases affecting children. 
 
                                                 
9 Mozambique reached the decision point for the original HIPC Initiative in April 1998; completion point 
was subsequently reached in June 1999. The IMF and World Bank approved a decision point for the 
Enhanced HIPC  in March 2000, aimed at bringing further debt reduction. Completion point under the 
enhanced HIPC is conditioned on the completion of a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, continued 
progress in implementing agreed policy measures, and satisfactory performance under the  program 
supported by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (IMF 2000). 
10 The IPRSP was presented in February 2000 in partial fulfillment of conditions established in the context 
of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. It is expected that the full PRSP will be finalized in March 2001. The 
IPRSP defines the reduction of the incidence of absolute poverty from the current level of around 70 
percent to around 50 percent in the next 10 years (GoM 2000a, 41).   9
SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROFILE 
Despite rapid economic growth in recent years, Mozambique remains a very poor 
country, with approximately 70 percent of the population living in poverty (GoM et al. 
1998).
11 These expenditure-based poverty measures are reflected in widespread food 
insecurity and poor health indicators. Sixty-four percent of all Mozambicans—over 10 
million people—live in food-insecure households (GoM et al. 1998). Prevalence of 
malnutrition implies higher risk of mortality and morbidity and of retarded physical and 
cognitive development.
12 
Poor environmental conditions and extremely limited access to water, sanitation, 
and health services also contribute to poor health status. Sixty-six percent of urban 
dwellers have access to a generally “safe” water source, like piped water, while only 12 
percent of rural dwellers do. A large percentage of the population gets water from a 
public or private well, but lakes and rivers remain an important source of water, 
particularly in the central region of the country. Only 21 percent of rural households have 
latrines. There is, however, considerable regional variation, and latrines are generally 
more common in urban areas (GoM et al. 1998). 
                                                 
11 Poverty benchmarks are provided by the recent poverty assessment (GoM et al. 1998). Average per-
capita consumption was estimated to be US$170 per year. There is considerable variation in the incidence 
of poverty between urban and rural areas as well as across provinces (see Appendix Table 3). The poverty 
line was constructed as the sum of a food poverty line plus a modest amount for nonfood consumption. For 
further details, see Datt et al. (2000). 
12 Although poverty is clearly an important factor, evidence suggests that the association between poverty 
and child malnutrition is fairly weak in Mozambique; environmental conditions and maternal education are 
important determinants (GoM et al. 1998).   10
As a consequence of malnutrition and poor living conditions and public services, 
the presence of endemic diseases, and other poverty related factors, mortality and 
morbidity indicators are among the worse in Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 1). Forty-one 
percent of all Mozambican children under age 5 are stunted and 6 percent are wasted 
(GoM et al. 1998).
13 The main causes of child deaths are diarrheal diseases and 
respiratory infections, especially pneumonia, but other infectious diseases such as 
measles, malaria, and whooping cough are also common (Walt 1983). Women also 
constitute a high-risk group. In particular, maternal mortality related to pregnancy or 
childbirth complications are common. A recent report estimated maternal mortality at 
1,500 per 100,000 live births, which is significantly above the average for Sub-Saharan  
 
Table 1: Selected socioeconomic indicators 
  Mozambique   
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–96  
(by income group) 
Selected indicators  1998     Lowest   Low  Middle  All 
             
Population (millions)  16.9    -  -  -  - 
GNP per capita (US$)  210.0    -  -  -  500.0 
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)  147.4    102.0  81.0  55.0  92.0 
Under-five mortality (per 1,000 live births)  218.7    173.0  125.0  74.0  151.0 
Life expectancy (years)  45.2           
  Male  -    48.1  52.4  59.7  55.3 
  Female  -    51.2  55.1  65.3  53.5 
Total fertility rate  5.2    6.3  5.4  3.4  5.8 
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births)  1,500.0   1,015.0  606.0  277.0  822.0 
Childhood stunting (percent)  35.9    44.5  30.6  22.6  38.9 
Source: World Bank (2000); Peters et al. (2000); Gwatkin et al. (2000); PRB (2000).  
 
                                                 
13 Children are considered stunted (wasted) if they fall <-2 Z-scores from the mean height-for-age (weight-
for-height). The IAF estimates of stunting and wasting should be treated as “lower bound” estimates 
because of the skewed sample of children with adequate age information.   11
Africa (PRB 2000).
14 Gwatkin et al. (2000) point out that national averages mask 
considerable inequality in health outcomes.  
 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND USER FEES 
Total health-sector financing—including government and aid expenditures, 
documented user fees, and conservative estimates of other household expenditures in the 
health sector (unofficial fees, pharmacy purchases, and traditional medical 
practitioners)—was estimated at US$139 million in 1997 (Yates and Zorzi 1999). This 
gives a total per-capita expenditure on health care and health services of merely $8.84. 
Beattie and Kraushaar (1999) point out that this is not only low by international 
standards, but also significantly below the normative standard of $12 for provision of a 
basic package of preventive and primary care proposed by the World Bank (World Bank 
1993). Per-capita expenditures by households are similar to locally financed government 
expenditures ($1.70 and $1.97, respectively).
15 Only a small proportion of these 
expenditures are on official declared fees to government health facilities. Fee-for-service 
payments to private allopathic health facilities and private commercial facilities are 
important, but the largest components of estimated household spending are unrecorded 
                                                 
14 Due to lack of data on incidence and causes of mortality, these maternal mortality estimates are based on 
birth rates and the proportion of births that are attended by a trained person. It is higher than many 
estimates reported elsewhere, and should probably be considered an upper bound. The reported causes for 
this high estimate include (1) poor access to health services; (2) large proportion of abortions undertaken by 
unsafe practitioners; (3) young age of childbirth; and (4) poor awareness of contraceptive measures.  
15 This is in spite of a considerable increase in government spending in the social sectors since the end of 
the conflict. The “peace dividend” has resulted in a reversal in budget allocations between defense and 
health and education (Devereux and Palermo 1999).   12
payments to government health facilities (unofficial or illegal fees) and payments to the 
traditional sector (Barbosa 1999; Beattie and Kraushaar 1999). More than half of total 
per-capita spending is financed by international agencies or NGOs ($2.92 and $1.68, 
respectively).
16 
User fees for consultations, clinical costs of inpatient services, and co-payment of 
medicines have been collected at the point of service in Mozambique since 1977. The 
fees were originally motivated by the need to encourage careful and wise use of health 
services rather than as a main source of revenue. The user fee schedule has always 
contained a long list of exemptions, covering both reasons for visits (e.g., preventive care 
and sexually transmitted diseases [STDs]) and characteristics of the individual seeking 
care (e.g., children under 5, elderly, handicapped, the poor, and pregnant women). There 
are, moreover, differences between urban and rural areas. In theory, collected funds are 
retained by the health facilities. Records and control mechanisms are, however, poor, and 
it is not clear to what extent this occurs (Barbosa 1999; Beattie and Kraushaar 1999). 
Currently, the table of fees for government facilities limits official co-payments 
for services in public facilities. For rural clinics the charge is a flat rate of 1,000 meticals 
(MT) for outpatient consultations. Urban health centers charge 5,000MT, while a hospital 
inpatient day is 10,000MT.
17 The fee schedules for both private practitioners and TMPs 
are unregulated. Medicines are charged individually but are heavily subsidized. Yet, 
notwithstanding the existence of regulation, the system of fees for services and 
                                                 
16 Most of NGO spending in the health sector is financed by international agencies. 
17 1US$ = 11,000MT (approximately) in 1997.   13
exemptions remains complex and incoherent, and illegal charges are pervasive (Barbosa 
1999). Aside from legally regulated fees, charges are made for (1) faster or better access 
to “normal” services, (2) service at “special clinics” in government facilities, (3) private 
drug sales in public facilities, and (4) payment for services of state health workers outside 
state facilities (Barbosa 1999). 
A range of studies has provided ample evidence of inconsistencies in the 
implementation of the user-fee policy. In part, problems arise from a lack of information. 
Most facilities do not have clear written and posted information on fee structures and 
exemption rules, and the majority of users learn about what fees are to be paid verbally 
(SDC et al. 2000). The Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) study also finds 
considerable variability in the fees paid by individuals, even for similar services. For 
example, in Tete, 64 percent of respondents paid more than 1,000MT for child 
consultations in health posts, compared to only 6 percent in Inhambane. Similarly, on the 
basis of household- and community-based interviews in three villages, Cabral (1999) 
found significant variation in the amounts that individuals paid. Moreover, expenditures 
were higher than would be expected, given the fee structure, and there was evidence of 
illegal payments.
18 In consequence of these problems, the user fee system was recovering 
as little as 2.7 percent of government recurrent health care spending in 1996 (Beattie and 
Kraushaar 1999). 
                                                 
18 Some types of treatment or care are particularly expensive. In particular, childbirth should be free, but 
women were often required to provide supplies. Similarly, considerable charges were made for injections to 
treat STDs. In consequence, many households had to sell animals or produce or go into debt to pay for 
health services (Cabral 1999).   14
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON ILLNESS AND 
HEALTH-SEEKING BEHAVIOR 
THE DATA 
The Household Survey 
The main source of data to be used in the research is the Mozambique National 
Household Survey on Living Conditions, 1996–97 (IAF).
19 The IAF was the first national 
household living standards survey fielded since the end of the civil war. The survey was 
designed and implemented by the National Statistics Institute in Mozambique, and was 
conducted from February 1996 to April 1997. The sample was selected in three stages 
and geographically stratified to ensure that (1) the entire sample is nationally 
representative, (2) the urban (rural) sample is representative of urban (rural) households, 
and (3) each provincial sample is representative at the province level (treating the capital 
city of Maputo as a separate province). This design allows for analysis at national, 
provincial, and urban/rural levels. The first stage of sample design entailed selecting 
localidades (rural) or bairros (urban) as primary sampling units, with units selected 
probability proportional to size (pps). Below this level, aldeias (rural) or quarterões 
(urban) were selected as secondary clusters. As the third and final stage, households were 
selected randomly from each aldeia/quarterão, and covered approximately 43,000 
individuals living in 8,250 households. The research in this paper focuses on the rural 
subsample, which consists of 28,270 individuals.  
                                                 
19 Inquérito Nacional aos Agregados Familiares Sobre as Condições de Vida (IAF).   15
The IAF was collected over 14 months, divided in 24 periods of 10 days each. In 
each period, the interviewer visited a certain number of households (12 in urban areas, 9 
in rural areas) three times. Each visit covered different sections of the questionnaire. The 
three principal instruments for the household-level interviews were (1) a principal survey 
questionnaire, (2) a daily household expenditure questionnaire, and (3) a daily personal 
expenditure questionnaire administered to all income-earning members within the 
household. 
Information collected at the individual level included demographic characteristics, 
migration history, health, education, and employment status. At the household level, 
information on landholding size and description, agricultural production, livestock and 
tree holdings, dwelling characteristics, types of basic services used, asset ownership, 
major nonfood expenditure during past month, transfers, and sources of income were 
collected.  
In addition to individual and household-level data, a community-level survey was 
administered and detailed market price information was collected. The community-level 
survey included questions on local infrastructure, access to services, and general 
community characteristics. It was collected for each village, but not in any urban areas. 
Price information was collected in the major market for each sampled bairro (urban 
areas) or localidade (rural areas). 
The individual-level IAF data were merged with data on public spending on 
health (current spending and spending on medicines). For this, district-level data were 
used, and attributed to each observation on the basis of reported residence at the time of   16
the interview. The data on public spending were collected by the respective Provincial 
Directorates of Health with the support of the SDC (Maputo) as part of the Integrated 
Provincial Planning initiative. Spending figures refer to execution and include all sources 
of funding. Current spending includes material, salaries, and medicines. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 
Reporting of Illness 
The IAF contains a series of questions pertaining to the health status of 
interviewees. Specifically, the questionnaire captures information on whether the 
interviewee suffered an illness episode or accident in the four weeks preceding the 
survey, the length and severity of illness, and the symptoms suffered.  
In the IAF, approximately 11.4 percent report being ill in the four weeks 
preceding the survey.
20 The rate of illness reporting is slightly higher in rural (11.6 
percent) than in urban (10.5 percent) areas. There is significant variation regionally and 
across provinces in reporting of illness. It is particularly high in Niassa (25.7 percent), 
Cabo Delgado (18 percent), Maputo (17 percent), and Manica (15.9 percent) (Table 2). 
Concentrating on households in rural areas, data suggest that women are more prone to 
report illness than men (12.8 and 10.3 percent, respectively).
21 Moreover, there is a rather 
                                                 
20 In what follows, all percentages are calculated using sampling weights, and comprise population 
estimates. 
21 Descriptive statistics from the IAF refer to the rural subsample unless otherwise specified.   17
Table 2: Population composition and reporting of illness, by province 
   Pop. comp. by 
province (%)        Percent of population reporting ill in 
month prior to survey  Province/region  Population 
(%) 
  Urban  Rural    
Poverty 
(%)  se 
   Rural  se    Urban  se    Total  se 
                                 
Niassa  4.9    23.4  76.6    70.7  3.8    25.4  3.6    26.8  2.6    25.7  2.8 
Cabo Delgado  8.2    7.6  92.5    57.4  4.2    17.8  1.6    21.0  0.2    18.0  1.5 
Nampula  19.5    20.1  79.9    68.9  3.3    11.1  0.7    9.2  2.4    10.8  0.8 
                                 
The North  32.5    17.4  82.6    66.2  2.3    15.0  1.0    14.0  2.2    14.8  0.9 
                                 
Zambézia  20.4    5.2  94.8    68.1  2.6    9.7  0.8    12.6  0.2    9.9  0.8 
Tete  7.3    13.0  87.0    82.3  3.2    9.6  1.0    10.2  3.7    9.6  1.0 
Manica  6.2    17.5  82.5    62.2  6.0    15.7  1.1    16.6  2.4    15.9  1.0 
Sofala  8.7    21.3  78.7    87.9  1.5    10.5  1.3    9.6  1.4    10.3  1.1 
                                 
The Center  42.6    11.6  88.4    73.7  1.6    10.6  0.5    11.9  1.0    10.8  0.5 
                                 
Inhambane  7.1    16.0  84.0    82.1  2.5    5.1  0.5    7.6  2.8    5.5  0.7 
Gaza  6.6    7.1  92.9    64.2  3.4    6.9  1.2    7.9  1.6    7.0  1.1 
Maputo Province  5.2    39.2  60.8    65.8  5.4    15.4  1.1    19.4  0.8    17.0  0.8 
                                 
The South (excluding 
Maputo City)  18.8    19.2  80.8    71.3  2.4    8.0  0.6    14.3  1.5    9.2  0.7 
                                 
Maputo City  6.1    100.0  0.0    47.5  4.1    100.0  0.0    3.8  0.6    3.8  0.6 
                                 




large difference between poor and nonpoor households in reporting of illness (10.1 and 
15.2 percent, respectively). This difference is quite consistent across provinces (Table 3). 
Illness reporting is particularly high for children, in particular infants, and elderly (46 
years or older) (Table 4).  
Self-reported data on the incidence of illness are notoriously problematic due to 
the subjectivity of responses. Makinen (1999) reviewed household surveys from eight 
developing countries from the period 1986–1997 and found considerable   18
Table 3: Reporting of illness in rural households 
   Rural households: Percent reporting illness in 4 weeks prior to survey 
Province/region  Total  se     Female  se     Male  se     Not 
poor  se     Poor  se 
                             
Niassa  25.4  3.6    27.0  3.2    23.6  4.2    26.2  3.2    25.0  4.1 
Cabo Delgado  17.8  1.6    17.9  1.8    17.6  1.6    21.0  2.0    15.3  2.1 
Nampula  11.1  0.7    13.3  0.7    9.0  1.2    14.2  1.9    9.5  0.7 
                             
The North  15.0  1.0    16.5  0.9    13.4  1.2    17.8  1.4    13.4  1.1 
                             
Zambézia  9.7  0.8    10.5  1.1    8.9  1.0    12.1  1.5    8.6  0.8 
Tete  9.6  1.0    10.6  1.1    8.4  1.0    17.7  2.2    7.9  1.0 
Manica  15.7  1.1    17.3  1.9    14.0  1.0    19.9  2.5    13.3  1.5 
Sofala  10.5  1.3    12.0  1.6    9.1  1.2    14.8  2.4    10.2  1.4 
                             
The Center  10.6  0.5    11.7  0.7    9.5  0.6    14.4  1.1    9.4  0.5 
                             
Inhambane  5.1  0.5    5.8  0.9    4.2  0.6    9.3  1.7    4.4  0.5 
Gaza  6.9  1.2    8.2  1.4    5.2  1.0    6.4  1.5    7.2  1.8 
Maputo Province  15.4  1.1    16.9  1.2    13.4  1.3    23.3  2.1    13.0  1.1 
                             
The South (excluding 
Maputo City)  8.0  0.6    9.2  0.7    6.4  0.6    10.3  1.0    7.2  0.7 
                             
Total  11.6  0.4     12.8  0.5     10.3  0.5     15.2  0.8     10.1  0.5 
 
 
Table 4: Reporting of illness, by age category (rural households) 
         Rural households: Percent of individuals reporting illness in month prior to survey 
Age  Population     Total  se     Female  se     Male  se     not 
poor  se     Poor  se 
                                 
0-1  6.7    22.4  1.7    22.6  2.5    22.1  2.2    29.7  5.5    19.9  1.4 
2-5  11.8    12.5  1.0    11.1  0.9    13.9  1.4    18.4  2.5    10.7  0.9 
6-15  29.7    6.0  0.5    5.7  0.6    6.2  0.6    7.1  1.0    5.6  0.6 
16-30  23.6    10.2  0.7    12.0  0.8    7.7  0.7    13.5  1.2    8.3  0.7 
31-45  13.4    12.9  0.8    16.5  1.3    9.2  1.0    13.6  1.4    12.7  0.9 
46+  14.7    18.8  1.0    21.6  1.2    15.9  1.2    23.4  1.8    16.1  1.0 
                                 
Total  100.0     11.6  0.4     12.8  0.5     10.3  0.5     15.2  0.8     10.1  0.5 
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differences across countries, both in respect of the overall incidence of illness and the 
distribution of morbidity across economic groups. The incidence of reported illness 
ranges from 62 percent in Burkina Faso to 7 percent in Thailand. Similarly, the incidence 
of illness is higher in poorer quintiles in some countries, whereas the reverse holds in 
others.
22 These egregious differences cast doubt on the use of self-reported morbidity in 
research and policy design. Moreover, measurement errors due to incorrect diagnosis and 
imperfect recall are also likely to be pervasive in data on self-reported health status. 
These issues will be discussed in further detail below. 
On the basis of reported illness episodes, the most common specific ailments are 
malaria (21.8 percent) and diarrhea (17.5 percent). However, approximately 35 percent of 
those reporting illness reported none of the listed symptom groups. There is significant 
regional variation in the pattern of reported illness (e.g., only 7.5 percent reported 
diarrhea in the South, compared with 17.5 percent national average).
23 Also, the regional 
aggregation masks some significant variation in reported illness pattern across provinces. 
There is also a noteworthy variation in the disease pattern across age categories. Diarrhea 
is a big problem in infants (38.8 percent of those ill suffer from diarrhea, compared to 
17.5 for all age groups). Among the elderly, 50.1 percent of those reporting illness suffer 
from symptoms other than those categories included in questionnaire (Table 5).
                                                 
22 There are differences among  the surveys covered in respect of geographical coverage, sampling 
techniques, recall period, formulation of questions, etc. This limits the scope for generalization across the 
surveys. 
23 The South includes Maputo Province, Maputo City, Gaza, Inhambane; the Center includes Sofala, 
Manica, Tete, and Zambézia; and the North includes Nampula, Cabo Delgado, and Niassa.  
Table 5: Type of illness of those reporting illness in month prior to survey 
   Rural households: Type of illness - percent of those reporting illness in month prior to survey 
        By region    By gender    By age category 
Type of illness  Total  se     North  se  Central  se  South  se    Male  se  Female  se     0-1  se  2-5  se  6-15  se  16-30  se  31-45  se  46+ 
                                                     
Diarrhea  17.5  2.2   18.0  1.8  20.1  4.6  7.5  1.4   18.0 2.2  17.2  2.5   38.8  5.3  22.4  3.6  15.2  3.3  13.2  2.0  18.7  3.4  7.3 
Cold, cough, breathing difficulty 7.9  0.8   8.2  1.3  7.7  1.1  8.0  1.3   7.5 1.0  8.2  0.9   6.6  1.8  9.2  2.1  7.7  2.2  4.6  0.9  9.7  1.6  10.1 
Worm  1.4  0.3   1.9  0.4  1.3  0.5  0.3  0.2   1.4 0.5  1.4  0.3   3.8  1.4  3.1  1.1  1.3  0.5  0.7  0.3  0.6  0.3  0.4 
Fever  7.9  0.7   7.7  1.1  7.5  1.1  9.9  1.9   7.0 1.0  8.6  0.8   8.5  1.6  11.8  2.4  10.0  1.7  9.0  1.4  5.1  1.1  4.8 
Persistent cough with vomiting  2.4  0.4   2.0  0.5  2.7  0.8  2.9  0.7   2.3 0.5  2.5  0.5   3.3  1.1  3.3  1.3  3.8  1.0  1.1  0.4  2.2  0.8  2.0 
Persistent cough with blood  1.5  0.3   2.1  0.5  0.9  0.5  1.4  0.5   1.9 0.6  1.2  0.3   0.8  0.5  0.9  0.6  2.5  0.8  1.1  0.4  1.6  0.8  2.0 
Skin eruptions  3.5  0.6   6.0  1.2  1.4  0.4  2.1  0.7   4.7 0.9  2.6  0.5   4.2  1.4  6.8  2.1  2.9  1.0  2.4  0.8  3.2  1.0  2.8 
Malaria  21.8  1.8   20.3  2.9  20.5  2.7  31.0  4.0   21.5 2.0  21.9  2.0   17.7  3.7  21.6  3.2  25.5  3.5  24.3  2.4  19.9  2.5  20.6 
Other  36.0  1.8   33.9  2.4  38.0  3.1  36.9  3.0   35.6 2.0  36.4  2.1   16.4  2.8  20.9  2.9  31.1  3.6  43.6  2.5  39.1  3.1  50.1 
                                                     







The Decision to Seek Care 
Individuals who report having suffered an illness episode in the last four weeks 
were asked follow-up questions relating to the type of treatment sought. There are quite 
considerable differences across provinces in the proportion of those reporting ill that seek 
care (from 48.8 percent [Manica] to 67.5 percent [Nampula]).
24 The national average for 
the rural population is 57.4 percent. A slightly higher proportion of men than women seek 
care. The percentage of individuals from poor households seeking care (56.3 percent) is 
slightly lower than for nonpoor individuals (59.2 percent) (Table 6). The percentage of 
infants (0–1 years) and children that attended a consultation in response to an illness 
episode is higher than for other age groups (74.4 and 62.0 percent, respectively, 
compared to 57 percent, on average). For the poor elderly, only 48 percent seek care 
(Table 7). 
There is, moreover, evidence that the decision to seek care is influenced by the 
type of illness the individual suffers from. In particular, of those suffering from diarrhea 
and malaria, 66.4 and 58.7 percent, respectively, seek care. This can be compared with 
44.8 percent for “cold, cough, and breathing difficulties” and 48.5 percent for “skin 
eruptions” (Table 8). The major reported reasons for not seeking treatment in the IAF 
were distance to health facility and lack of money to pay for care. 
                                                 
24 The alternative “no consultation” should not necessarily be equated with no treatment. Depending on the 
type of disease and knowledge of the individual/household there may be considerable scope for self-
treatment.   22
Table 6: The decision to seek care 
   Rural households: Percent of those ill that report seeking care 
Province/region  Total  se     Female  se     Male  se     N. poor  se     Poor  se 
                             
Niassa  58.6  6.9    53.3  5.4    64.9  8.9    62.9  9.9    56.8  7.1 
Cabo Delgado  51.0  3.9    53.0  4.7    49.0  4.9    47.6  5.2    54.6  6.5 
Nampula  67.5  3.8    62.5  4.5    75.0  4.6    66.2  5.7    68.4  3.7 
                             
The North  59.9  2.8    57.5  2.9    62.9  3.7    58.3  4.0    61.1  3.2 
                             
Zambézia  60.3  4.3    61.4  5.7    59.0  4.1    66.5  6.7    56.2  3.9 
Tete  52.2  8.8    55.9  8.8    47.2  9.3    55.3  12.1    50.9  8.9 
Manica  48.8  3.8    48.0  5.0    49.7  3.4    50.2  6.4    47.5  3.8 
Sofala  50.5  4.9    48.9  5.1    52.7  5.7    51.3  8.1    50.4  5.2 
                             
The Center  55.0  2.9    55.5  3.6    54.3  2.7    59.7  4.8    52.5  2.6 
                             
Inhambane  59.0  5.5    59.3  5.9    58.5  6.7    58.9  8.6    59.0  6.6 
Gaza  63.8  9.0    63.0  9.8    65.4  9.3    76.6  10.5    57.5  9.3 
Maputo Province  50.1  4.1    49.2  4.1    51.8  5.3    50.7  6.7    49.8  4.8 
                             
The South (excluding 
Maputo City)  57.1  3.8    56.6  4.2    58.1  4.1    61.8  6.4    55.0  4.0 
                             




Table 7: The decision to seek care, by age category (rural households) 
         Rural households: Percent of individuals seeking care 
Age  Population     Total  se     Female  se     Male  se     not 
poor  se     poor  se 
                                 
0-1  6.7    71.5  3.4    69.0  6.1    74.4  4.8    74.9  7.2    69.9  3.7 
2-5  11.8    62.0  3.8    61.9  4.3    62.0  5.8    70.6  8.2    57.5  4.0 
6-15  29.7    55.4  3.6    51.9  5.3    58.3  4.0    57.2  6.6    54.7  3.9 
16-30  23.6    54.2  3.0    54.5  3.3    53.6  4.4    55.7  4.0    52.9  3.8 
31-45  13.4    56.2  3.0    58.4  3.7    52.0  4.3    51.1  4.6    58.4  3.7 
46+  14.7    51.8  2.8    50.8  3.1    53.2  4.0    55.8  3.8    48.4  3.4 
                                 




Table 8: Health-seeking behavior, by type of illness 
      Rural households: Choice of treatment - prop. by type 
of illness 
  No. of days unable to 
perform basic functions   
Cost of 
consultation   Cost of medicine 
Type of illness 
% seeking  
care 
se  Hosp.  Private  H. post 
Trad. 
healer  Other  Total     median  mean 
% still w/o 
function     median  mean     median  mean 
                                     
Diarrhea  66.4  5.5  13.0  2.6  62.2  16.1  6.2  100.0    7  10  29.6    500  2,045    1,000  2,745 
Cold, cough, breathing difficulty  44.8  4.7  23.0  2.0  51.2  18.2  5.6  100.0    7  15  29.4    500  1,659    2,000  6,490 
Worm  58.3  8.4  19.2  5.0  65.9  10.0  0.0  100.0    7  7  65.8    500  1,341    1,000  3,525 
Fever  53.4  5.9  21.6  0.5  59.7  10.8  7.4  100.0    7  9  20.9    500  4,395    1,500  6,564 
Persistent cough w. vomiting  49.7  8.1  17.4  2.0  57.9  17.5  5.2  100.0    7  9  42.6    500  2,610    2,000  9,578 
Persistent cough w. blood  56.8  10.0  54.9  0.0  42.5  2.6  0.0  100.0    5  7  78.7    500  676    5,000  6,013 
Skin eruptions  48.5  5.0  16.3  0.0  63.4  19.4  0.9  100.0    5  17  62.2    500  1,034    3,000  6,684 
Malaria  58.7  3.1  25.5  0.7  49.6  15.8  8.5  100.0    7  12  19.3    500  1,000    2,400  15,374 
Other  57.3  2.2  26.7  1.1  43.9  22.8  5.5  100.0    8  15  37.8    500  3,244    1,500  11,045 
                                     








Choice of Health Care Provider 
The behavioral response to an illness episode reflects the complex nature of health 
as well as the economic and social context in which health and health care is embedded. 
Given an individual’s perception of an illness episode, physical and financial constraints, 
previous experiences, and treatment options, a course of action will be chosen. This may 
entail multiple visits with one or more health care providers.
25 The behavioral response is 
moreover likely to depend on type of disease. There are theoretical reasons to expect this 
to be related to observability of symptoms and effects of treatment as well as the type of 
“contract” offered by different providers (Leonard and Leonard 1998). Moreover, Mwabu 
(1986) offers empirical evidence of consultation patterns being highly sensitive to 
patients’ illnesses.  
In the IAF, those who reported having a consultation were asked to specify 
whether this consultation was at/with a (1) hospital, (2) private clinic, (3) health post, 
(4) doctor, (5) nurse, (6) pharmacy, (7) traditional medical practitioner, or (8) other.
26 
Choice is limited to one consultation only. If several consultations were made in the last 
month, answers refer to the last consultation. The survey therefore ignores many of the 
complexities that are likely to characterize health-seeking behavior. Beattie and 
                                                 
25 There is indeed evidence that consumers of health care are likely to use more than one provider. In such 
a context, past experience of treatments may be an important determinant of visit patterns. Mwabu (1986) 
offers evidence that this is the case. 
26 NGOs have a considerable presence in the health sector in Mozambique. However, they work mainly 
through the public sector and support the delivery of community-based preventive health care. NGOs’ 
operation of health service facilities is limited to one clinic in Maputo City and a number of health centers 
and health posts operated by the Catholic church in Niassa, Nampula, and Zambézia. The private sector is 
very limited in Mozambique, particularly outside the larger cities (Yates and Zorzi 1999).   25
Kraushaar (1999) report evidence from Mozambique that people use TMPs both before, 
during, and after consulting government or private clinical services for the same episode 
of illness. It is known that the payment practices of TMPs are considerably more flexible 
than for government or private clinics. Indeed, Cabral (1999) finds that many of the poor 
households choose to seek care from a TMP because they can pay gradually, and that 
poor households consult with TMPs even when other types of care are available and 
cheaper.  
Turning to recorded consultation patterns, there is a significant difference in 
provider choice between urban and rural areas. In urban areas, 57.8 percent of those 
seeking care report attending hospitals. The corresponding percentage for rural areas is 
22.8 percent. Mirroring this difference, individuals in rural areas are more likely to attend 
health posts (51.7 percent) and traditional practitioners (18 percent). This can be 
compared to 30.4 and 2.4 percent, respectively, in urban areas. There are, moreover, large 
regional discrepancies in health-seeking behavior. In particular, a higher percentage of 
those living in the south attend hospitals, and are less likely to seek care at a health post 
or with a traditional practitioner. Notably, there are no large differences in provider 
choice according to gender, and individuals in poor households appear to make very 
similar choices to those in nonpoor. Provider choice is, however, affected by the age of 
the ill individual. Only 7.3 percent of infants receive treatment at a traditional practitioner 
(compared with 18 percent, on average, for rural households). Conversely, individuals   26
older than 16 are more likely to seek care at a traditional practitioner and less likely to 
attend a hospital or a health post.
27 See Table 9 for further details. 
There are a host of factors that can contribute to an explanation of both low levels 
of health care utilization and differences in use patterns across geographical regions and 
demographic and socioeconomic groups. These will be explored in more detail in the 
analytical section of this paper. Difference in physical access is clearly an important 
issue. The IAF contained a community-level section that, among other things, reports 
distance to health care providers. Only 21.6 percent of individuals live in a village with a 
health post or a health center. In contrast, 95 percent of individuals live in villages in 
which a TMP is operating. There is significant variation in these percentages across 
provinces. Predictably, the median distance to the closest practitioner/facility is highest 
for doctors (50 percent of individuals in rural households live more than 30 kilometers 
away from a doctor) and health centers (20 kilometers), and substantially lower for health 
posts (8 kilometers) and traditional practitioners (0 kilometers).  
Distances are also reflected in the time spent traveling in search of care. The data 
suggest that individuals are prepared to travel longer to attend a private clinic. 
Conversely, those seeking care from traditional practitioners or “other” practitioners 
spend less time traveling to receive care; 71 percent and 78 percent of individuals report  
                                                 
27 Forty-four percent of TMP-rendered services were not for the common infectious diseases.  Thirty 
percent of the patients in this group reported choosing the TMP because the local health facility did not 
treat the disease. This suggests a sizable unmet demand for adult specialty care (Christie and Ferrara 1999).   
Table 9: Choice of health care provider 
      Rural households: Choice of practitioner - percent of those reporting illness in month prior to survey and who sought care 
          By region    By gender    By expenditure    By age category 
Practitioner  Total 
urban 
Total 
rural  se    North  Center  South    Male  Female    Not poor  Poor    0-1  2-5  6-15  16-30  31-45  46+ 
                                                           
Hospital  57.8  22.8  2.3    15.5  22.9  47.2    22.3  23.2    21.8  23.4    25.1  20.5  19.4  18.4  24.1  28.2 
Private  2.6  1.4  0.3    0.9  1.4  2.6    1.2  1.5    1.9  1.0    1.5  0.3  0.2  1.7  3.0  1.2 
Health post  30.4  51.7  2.8    59.4  51.1  27.8    53.0  50.7    53.2  50.8    59.7  58.4  60.7  47.7  45.3  43.0 
Traditional healer  2.4  18.0  1.8    19.5  20.3  5.3    17.3  18.5    18.2  17.9    7.3  16.6  15.6  23.5  21.7  21.3 
Other  6.9  6.2  1.0    4.7  4.3  17.1    6.3  6.0    5.0  6.9    6.5  4.2  4.1  8.7  6.0  6.4 









that it takes less than an hour to reach a TMP or “other” provider, respectively. The IAF 
also records waiting time. Individuals seeking care in hospitals appear to wait more, with 
50 percent waiting more than one hour. At private clinics and health posts, 66 and 68 
percent, respectively, wait for less than one hour, while the corresponding number for 
those seeking care from a TMP is 90 percent (Table 10). 
In addition to time costs, individuals that seek care may also incur direct costs 
associated with travel, consultation, and medicines. Data on travel costs are not available 
in the IAF, but data on payments for consultation and medicines were collected for 
individuals who sought care. There is considerable variability in recorded payments. 
There appears to be only minor differences in payments between hospitals and health 
posts. The highest average payments are made to traditional practitioners (7,224MT), but 
this average is driven by a highly skewed distribution of payments, and the median 
payment is zero. In general, payments vary with the type of provider, the age of the 
patient, the region of the country, and the number of days of illness. Factors like gender 
and the economic status of the patient appeared to have little influence on the reported 
payment (Christie and Ferrara 1999) (see Table 10). However, as it is not clear what 
services or medicines were received in exchange for the payments made, these data do 
not provide much insight. Individuals paid varying amounts for medication, depending on 
age and the type of provider visited. There were numerous cases of nonpayment. 
However, it is not clear from the data whether medicine was dispensed or payment in 
kind was made. 
Table 10: Payment, travel time, and waiting time. by type of practitioner (rural) 




(percent)    
Payment for 
consultation 
(meticais)   
Time to reach health care provider 
(percent of those seeking care) 
 
Reported waiting time 
(percent of those seeking care) 
Practitioner  Total 
rural    Median  Mean     0-1 hr  1-2 hrs  2-3 hrs  3-5 hrs  +5 hrs     0-1 hr  1-2 hrs  2-3 hrs  3-5 hrs  5+ hrs 
                                    
Hospital  22.8    500  1603    41.0  26.4  11.9  16.9  3.7    50.2  18.1  11.9  18.3  1.6 
Private  1.4    500  759    31.3  16.9  16.9  22.0  12.9    65.9  13.2  20.9  0.0  0.0 
Health post  51.7    500  1357    48.5  23.1  11.6  14.6  2.3    67.9  12.7  12.0  5.6  1.7 
Traditional healer  18.0    0  7224    70.5  8.2  8.8  10.4  2.1    89.8  3.2  1.5  1.2  4.4 
Other  6.2    0  414    78.0  5.6  11.0  4.8  0.6    94.0  2.5  0.9  2.1  0.4 











Finally, poor quality may constrain demand for health services from the public 
sector. There are many studies demonstrating the importance of different dimensions of 
quality in health-seeking behavior (see, for example, Akin et al. 1998; Hutchinson 1999; 
Litvack and Bodart 1993).
28 There is only limited information on quality of health care in 
Mozambique. A recent survey of health facilities in four provinces documents the poor 
state of infrastructure, staffing, and drug availability in many rural health facilities (SDC 
et al. 2000). Another study seeks to measure different dimensions of quality (URC 1998). 
Following Donabedian (1980), the “structure-process-outcome” trilogy is used to 
structure the research.
29 The study sampled health facilities in several districts across 
three provinces (Gaza, Zambézia, and Niassa) and focused on two essential services: 
antenatal and outpatient consultations. The structural aspects of quality focused on the 
qualifications of staff and the presence of resources in adequate quantities; process 
measurement focused on patient-physician interaction and the appropriateness of 
diagnosis and treatment; outcome related to patient satisfaction and patient information 
regarding diagnosis and treatment. The study found that most facilities scored well in 
terms of structural quality, while results on process and outcome were poorer. In other 
words, the facilities appeared to have the necessary equipment and staff, but the diagnosis 
and treatment were not always appropriate and were not communicated effectively to 
                                                 
28 For a review, see Alderman and Lavy (1996) and Wouters (1991). 
29 The problem of the “trilogy” approach lies in the tenuous links between different dimensions of quality. 
For example, quality of structural inputs by no means assures good care. Similarly, the link between 
process and outcome is not clear; it is likely to vary by process and may not be visible for a long time. 
Favorable outcomes are often affected by factors not under direct control of the health worker. This then 
raises the question of how to weight different dimensions of health care quality.   31
patients. Moreover, there was considerable variation across provinces in the different 
quality measures. The quality score appeared to have little relation to the per-capita 
expenditure in the province, but quality improved somewhat with resources per health 
worker (Beattie and Kraushaar 1999). 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The empirical analysis of this paper is underpinned by a basic theoretical 
framework of utility maximization and household production of health. This is similar to 
the approach of previous health care demand studies (e.g., Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson 
1987; Gertler and van der Gaag 1990). In this framework, utility of individual  ] , 1 [ I i˛  is 
a function of health status, h, and nonhealth consumption, x: 
 
) , ( i i x h U U = . 
 
Utility is maximized subject to a health production function and a budget 
constraint: 
 
) , , , ; , ( Z E M R F C h h i i i =  
 
F p C p y x F C - - = . 
 
In the health production function, C represents the quantity and quality of health 
care; F comprises other health inputs (e.g., sanitation, food consumption); R captures   32
individual attributes (e.g., age and gender); M and E are household and community 
characteristics, respectively; and Z is a vector of choice or alternative specific attributes. 
Nonhealth consumption is given by exogenous income, y, minus the cost of health inputs. 
The prices, pC and pF, reflect both direct charges and opportunity cost of time spent 
seeking care (waiting and travel time).




) ), , , ; , ( ( F p C p y E M R F C h U U F C - - = . 
 
This equation can be used as the basis for a random utility model for 
polychotomous choice. Conditional on being ill, an individual faces J options. Each 
option differs in terms of its impact on health status and total cost. So, for choice j, we 
can then define 
*
j V as the level of indirect utility associated with that alternative: 
 
) ), , , ; , ( (
* F p C p y E M R F C h U V F Cj j j - - = . 
 
*
j V  contains an error term that reflects imperfect optimization as well as measurement 
error. The observed variable, Vj , is defined as  
 
                                                 
30 A fuller specification would endogenize income. In such a  model, the constraints include (1) health 
production function, (2) time constraint (market work, household care activities, leisure, household 
production), (3) market wage equation (endogenous and dependent on health and work effort), (4) farm 
production function, and (5) full income constraint (Pitt 1993). 
31 The superscript i is dropped for simplicity. Throughout we refer to the utility function of a representative 
individual i.   33
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j V is, however, observed conditional on an individual being ill, giving rise to a potential 
selection problem. This issue will be discussed further below.  
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF HEALTH CARE DEMAND 
To operationalize this general framework, it is necessary to define a functional 
form for the indirect utility function and to select a mapping from continuous utility into 
[0,1] space. The most common empirical specification of this general framework is the 
linear model (see, for example, Akin et al. 1984; 1986b; Mwabu 1986): 
 
j j j j j j h x V e b b + + = 2 1
*  . 
 
Here, utility is a function of nonhealth consumption, xj, and health, hj, conditional 
on receiving care from a health care provider of type j. The constraints are given by 
 
j j j j j j j j
j j
Z E M R h
p y x
h g g g g g + + + + + =
- =
4 3 2 1 0
 . 
 
Again, nonhealth consumption is the difference between exogenous income, y, 
and the unit cost of care (where unit represents a visit, and it is assumed that an individual 
only has one consultation) from provider j, pj. Health is a function of individual 
characteristics, R, household characteristics, M, community characteristics, E, and   34
provider/choice attributes, Zj. An estimable equation is achieved by using the budget 
constraint and a health production function in the utility function 
 
j j j j j j j j j j j j Z E M R p y V e h g g g g g b b + + + + + + + - = ) ( ) ( 4 3 2 1 0 2 1
* . 
 
However, in this specification, it is assumed that responsiveness to prices is 
independent of income.
32 This fact was pointed out by Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson 
(1987), and Gertler and van der Gaag (1990).
33 In response to this perceived weakness, 
they proposed an empirical specification based on a semiquadratic utility function that is 
linear in health but quadratic in consumption. In this specification, 
 







j j q h h + = 0 , 
j j j j j j j j Z E M R q h g g g g g b + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 0 , 
j j p y x - = , 
j j j wt f p + =  . 
 
 
Quality, qj, represents the expected health improvement resulting from treatment 
from a provider of type j (expected efficacy of each alternative). Thus, the expected 
health state, conditional on care from provider j, hj, is the sum of the health state from no 
                                                 
32 To see this, it suffices to note that the difference in utility between two choices does not depend on 
income, and hence income does not affect choice. 
33 Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson (1987) also note that under the linear model, the marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption for health is constant, which is inconsistent with health being a normal good.   35
care, h0, and expected health improvement, qj. As quality is unobserved, qj is specified as 
a parametric function of its observable determinants, where the expected improvements 
in health can be viewed as being produced through a household production function. The 
relevant arguments include individual (R), household (M), community (E) and provider 
(Z) characteristics.
34 Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson (1987) note that since both marginal 
utility of an individual’s health and the production of health depend on demographic 
variables, the effects cannot be identified separately (see Pollak and Wachter 1975). They 
therefore propose a reduced form model where utility is derived from quality. The cost of 
care from provider j is given by the user fee fj and the opportunity cost of time (tj) spent 
seeking care. Combining these equations, we get 
 
j j j j j j j j j j j p y p y Z E M R h V e b b h g g g g g b + - + - + + + + + + + =
2
2 1 4 3 2 1 0 0 0
* ) ( ) ( . 
 
 
There are a number of terms in this equation that do not vary with j. Because they 
therefore do not influence choice, they can be dropped. The estimated equation hence 
becomes 
 
j j j j j j j j j j j j y p p p Z E M R V e h b b b g g g g g + + - + - + + + + = 2
2
2 1 4 3 2 1 0
* 2  . 
 
 
                                                 
34 Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson (1987) and Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) do not explicitly include 
vectors of household and community characteristics in the health production function. They are included 
here for completeness.   36
Although this specification permits interaction between price and income, Dow 
(1996a) raises a number of concerns in respect of the implicit restrictions that the model 
embodies. As an alternative, he proposes a “flexible behavioral model”: 
 
j j j j k j
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This specification introduces a number of changes and has been favored in some 
recent studies of health care demand (see, for example, Akin et al. 1998). First, in this 
flexible specification, coefficients on price and price/income variables are allowed to 
vary across alternatives. This arises from a relaxation of the assumption of additive 
separability in the utility function. Dow (1996b) notes that although additive separability 
has been strongly rejected in continuous demand models (see, for example, Deaton and 
Muellbauer 1983), this assumption is maintained in most empirical models of health care 
demand.
35 The assumption can be relaxed in a number of ways. Dow proposes the 
inclusion of an interaction term between consumption and health improvements in the 
utility function; rich and poor may place different values on improvement in health status. 
In practical terms, this implies that both income and price terms may be estimated with 
                                                 
35 That is, conditional utility is represented as an additively separable function of health and nonhealth 
consumption.   37
separate alternative-specific coefficients.
36 Dow (1996b) finds that in data from Côte 
d’Ivoire, the inclusion or exclusion of alternative-specific income variables is not a 
serious source of misspecification, but that constraints across price coefficients do appear 
important. 
Second, Dow seeks to add flexibility to the basic model through the 
parameterization of the budget period. The idea is based on Gertler, Locay, and 
Sanderson (1987). They note that the appropriate measure of income depends on the 
functioning of credit markets. If capital markets are perfect, the relevant income 
constraint is the present value of income. At the other extreme, the income constraint is 
the current income. They propose a specification that permits this issue being resolved by 
the data. Income was measured as total family income in the month prior to the survey. 
Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson find that the hypothesis that budgeting is restricted to one 
period is accepted, and hence data on current income are applicable. On this basis, Dow 
(1996b) specifies residual consumption as 
j t j p y x - = l , , 
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where 
c
j Q  refers to the relevant  health improvement that affects the marginal utility of  nonhealth 
consumption. Clearly, 
c
j Q  is not observed, and it operates as multiplicatively with the coefficients to 
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where lambda is an unknown parameter representing the budgeting period for the income 
y from which the health care price pj is subtracted. In practical terms, the inclusion of an 
unobserved coefficient means that the coefficient on quadratic consumption can differ 
between price and income in the estimation. This, in turn, means that the restriction on 
the coefficients on  6 a and  7 a is relaxed.
37 Lambda may not be recoverable but will still 
improve estimates. Dow (1996b) moreover argues for the inclusion of cross-prices in the 
utility from choice j, providing theoretical justification for this by assuming forward-
looking behavior. 
Finally, Dow (1996a) notes that the market wage may systematically overestimate 
the value of time because of presence of unemployment or underemployment. Similarly, 
the travel time variable is problematic, because the costs of travel may, in many 
instances, be shared with other activities, such as a visit to the market. For this reason, 
full cost of care from j may be specified as 
 
j j j wt f p d + =  . 
 
 
This implies that the coefficient on wt can differ from that on the user fee. Dow 
also proposes that separate coefficients are estimated for travel time (travel may enter the 
health production function, and long travel times may further worsen the health status of 
an ill individual) and wages (which affect the cost of remaining ill). This can be justified 
                                                 
37 From above we had  7 6 2a a - = .   39
on theoretical grounds, and Dow (1996b) also finds that travel time has an effect 
independent of opportunity cost of time.  
 
ISSUES IN ESTIMATION OF HEALTH CARE DEMAND 
Sample Selection 
Most studies of health care demand in developing countries are based on 
household survey data. In these surveys, information relating to health care decisions is 
only reported conditional on previous reporting of illness (typically within a two- or four-
week recall period). It is generally expected that the frequency and severity of illness is 
inversely related to income, or at least that poor individuals are more at risk of poor 
health. It is further conventionally claimed that individuals in richer households are more 
likely to report illness, given their objective clinical health status.
38 This may be because 
richer households have a lower tolerance threshold for their definition of “ill” than do 
poorer households. Also, recall of illness episodes may be related to education and formal 
treatment episodes. Both of these factors would make illness reporting by wealthier 
households more likely for a given health status.
39 
Due to these features of the data, estimation of models of health-seeking behavior 
using as a sample those who report an illness episode is likely to result in selectivity bias. 
                                                 
38 Wolfe and Behrman (1984) provide some evidence of this. 
39 Although some forms of self-reported morbidity data are more reliable a s indicators of true health 
status—for example,  self-reported functional activity limitations, responses to whether one is healthy 
enough to perform normal duties is also likely to be endogenous, because an individual with a given 
objective health status is more likely to perform his or her normal activities if he or she is from a relatively 
poorer household, due to diminishing marginal utility of consumption goods (Behrman and Deolalikar 
1988).   40
It should be noted that there are really two selection processes operating simultaneously. 
Even in the absence of reporting bias, the process of illness determination may comprise 
a selection process that biases estimates. However, because it is not possible to establish 
objectively verifiable criteria for illness, these two sources of bias cannot be 
distinguished. Sample selection bias arises if unobserved individual characteristics 
simultaneously determine illness reporting and choice of treatment, that is, if factors 
associated with seeking care when sick also influence the reporting of health status.
40 In 
light of the policy-related use of estimates of coefficients in health care demand 
functions, the potential presence of bias is important.  
Although the selection issue is recognized in a number of studies of health-
seeking behavior (such as Akin, Guilkey, and Denton 1995; Dor and van der Gaag 1993; 
Pitt 1993; Schultz and Tansel 1997), most studies have ignored the problem, treating 
those individuals that report an illness episode as a subsample.
41 More recently, a range 
of approaches has been proposed to address the problem. Some contributors have sought 
to correct for selection bias, either through a two-step process or through a FIML 
procedure. Unbiased estimates of conditional demand can be found using a two-step 
                                                 
40 Correlation between error terms in selection and health care choice can be due to a range of factors: the 
presence of unobservables such as perception of illness or health endowment. Akin et al. (1998) further 
suggest that bias may arise due to self-selection into the sample of self-perceived ill who are, on average, 
more severely ill. It is reasonable to expect that the severely ill are likely to be less responsive to prices and 
other factors constraining use of health care facilities. In this case, the bias is due to the omission of 
severity of illness from the estimation of health care demand. It should be noted that insofar as the reporting 
bias is correlated only with observables, conditional estimates would not be biased. 
41 Some studies recognize the selection issue but dismiss it as unimportant. For example, Akin, Guilkey, 
and Denton (1995) omit the determination of illness on the assumption that economic variables are more 
important in the decision of what to do after the onset of illness than the actual process of getting sick.    41
method similar to that proposed in Heckman (1976). A procedure for the discrete choice 
setting is provided by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981), who control for selection bias 
in probit estimation.  
This approach is often difficult to implement; estimation of the determinants of 
illness is problematic in the absence of very large samples, and identification of illness 
instruments is made difficult by the reduced nature of the demand equation and the 
absence in most data sets of information on factors that affect (reporting of) illness but 
not choice of care. In view of these problems, some contributors have opted to use the 
entire sample and treat the reporting of no illness as one of a range of choices. For 
example, Pitt (1993) proposes that the appropriate procedure to deal with selectivity bias 
is to estimate a polychotomous variable model having as dependent variable a set of 
indicators for choice of provider if ill (or pregnant) but also for the outcome “not ill” (or 
not pregnant). Similarly, Dow (1996b) addresses the issue of bias from self-reported 
health status through a four-choice model in which individuals choose between “well”; 
“ill, no care”; “ill, clinic care”; and “ill, hospital care.”
 42 For this model, different 
estimation procedures and nesting structures are considered, where each specification 
permits a different covariance structure of the unobserved variables. In order to deal with 
the selection issue in a satisfactory manner through this procedure, it is necessary to 
estimate the model using a multinomial probit specification. Due to the greater 
                                                 
42 The idea here is that “not ill” can be considered another discrete choice, alongside different types of care 
or “self-care” in the event of illness. Dow (1996b) justifies this interpretation with reference to a dynamic 
model where individuals choose the probability of illness in previous periods by adjusting previous health 
inputs. This permits Dow to define joint health and health care demand error distributions on the entire 
population, thereby avoiding difficulty of sequential selection rules.   42
computational requirements in probit estimation, this restricts the number of alternatives 
to four.  
Unfortunately, there are no clear conclusions, either in respect of the seriousness 
of the selection problem, or the appropriate way to deal with it. Dor and van der Gaag 
(1993) use a two-step approach and find no selection bias in health care demand 
estimated conditional on being ill. Using a different methodology, Dow (1996b) finds 
that in data from Côte d’Ivoire, health demand estimates conditioned on health status do 
not suffer from statistical selection bias. Akin et al. (1998), on the other hand, estimate an 
illness equation jointly with the choice of care equation
43 and find that failure to control 
for sample selectivity of the reported illness does reduce the estimated price coefficient in 
the demand equation. In light of the inconclusive evidence and the computational 
restrictions of probit estimation, the model is estimated without controlling for selection 
bias.  
Under the hypothesis that individuals in poor households underreport illness 
relative to individuals in richer households, using the self-reported ill subsample entails 
the exclusion of a number of poor individuals, who, if it were possible to apply objective 
criteria of health status, would have been considered ill. Further, on the assumption that 
they would have reported themselves ill if they had consulted a medical practitioner, we 
can presume that all these individuals would have reported “no consultation” to a 
                                                 
43 This is possible, in part, due to the size of the sample, but also because it contains a number of variables 
that permit identification, such as kind of housing, type of water supply, sanitation, and other household 
assets.   43
question about response to illness. We would therefore expect that the effect of income, 
and possibly other covariates with income, on the probability of not seeking care, would 
be biased. Specifically, we would expect our estimates to comprise lower bounds (in 
absolute terms) on the marginal effect of income on the probability of seeking no care in 
the event of illness. There would, of course, be a corresponding effect on marginal effect 
of income associated with the other alternatives.  
 
Functional Form 
We have specified a general model of utility maximization using a random utility 
model based on McFadden (1973). McFadden (1981) shows that the Multinomial Logit 
Model (MNLM) can, under certain conditions, be derived from the latent variable model 
by specifying the distribution of error terms as IID with type I extreme value distribution. 
The basic multinomial logit model is  
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for all j, where X and b are vectors. In order to achieve identification, one of the 
coefficient vectors is set to zero. The independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is a 
well-known feature of the MNLM. By construction, the relative probability of choosing 
two alternatives is unaffected by the presence of additional alternatives. One way around 
this problem is to model choice as a sequential process. This gives rise to the Nested   44
Multinomial Logit model (NMLM). The NMLM may work well in cases where the 
alternatives are dissimilar.  
The previous literature offers no clear guidance on the appropriateness of the 
MNLM. Mwabu, Ainsworth, and Nyamete (1993) note that a priori there is no way of 
determining the decision structure of health care choice. They therefore opt for standard 
Multinomial Logit estimation. Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson (1987), on the other hand, 
test for difference between the nested and the standard multinomial logit and reject the 
hypothesis that MNL is not different from NMNL. Similarly, Dor, Gertler, and van der 
Gaag (1987) reject MNL in favor of NMNL. Akin, Guilkey, and Denton (1995) are the 
first to use the Multinomial Probit estimation method. In this way, they are not required 
to make a priori assumptions about the covariance of error terms, and hence do not suffer 
from the IIA problem. The study (Akin, Guilkey, and Denton 1995) rejects the 
restrictions imposed by the IIA assumption.
44  
In light of this evidence, and given the seemingly natural structure of the choice 
situation at hand, the NMNL may appear preferable. However, there is no well-defined 
testing procedure for discriminating among tree structures. Insofar as results differ across 
different specifications of the choice structure, this feature of the model is problematic. 
Moreover, McFadden (1984, 1414) points out that “empirical experience is that the MNL 
is relatively robust, as measured by goodness of fit or prediction accuracy, in many cases 
where the IIA property is theoretically implausible.” The nonnested MNLM is also easier 
                                                 
44 The multinomial probit model is, however, computationally cumbersome, as multiple (one less than 
number of categories) integrals must be calculated.   45
to deal with computationally. For this reason, the model is estimated on the basis of a 
standard MNLM. 
 
Sample Design and Estimation Technique 
As noted above, the IAF is a three-stage sample characterized by stratification and 
clustering. Due to these features of sample design, households in the population do not 
have an equal probability of inclusion in the sample. Moreover, both stratification and 
clustering affect the variance of estimates.
45 Differential selection probabilities render the 
unweighted sample mean a biased and inconsistent estimator of the population mean. An 
analogous problem arises in unweighted regression analysis.  
As is pointed out by Deaton (1997), the central issue of concern is heterogeneity, 
not sample design. If “groups” or “sectors” in the sample are, in fact, homogeneous in the 
sense that parameter coefficients of the “true” model are the same across the groups or 
sectors, both unweighted and weighted estimation will generate unbiased estimators. In 
this case, unweighted estimation would be preferred as it is more efficient. However, 
matters are more complicated in the presence of heterogeneity. If this is a feature of the 
data, the problem of recovering sensible parameters is independent of the issue of 
weighting, and a case can be made for weighted regression where regression analysis is 
                                                 
45 Stratification can reduce the variance of estimates by the use of prior information on about the 
population to avoid between-sector variation in replication of the sample. Conversely, clustering of a 
sample will typically reduce the precision of sampling estimates because households in any given cluster 
are likely to display similarities. Hence, less information about the population is gained by sampling a 
given number of households from a cluster than if households from many clusters were sampled (Deaton 
1997).   46
seen as a device for summarizing characteristics of the population (Deaton 1997). In 
other words, in contrast to the unweighted regression, the weighted regression provides a 
consistent estimate of the “population regression function.” 
Following Doumochel and Duncan (1983) and Deaton (1997), both weighted and 
unweighted estimators were estimated. Insofar as there is homogeneity across groups or 
sectors, point estimates would be similar. This permits an informal test of whether the 
null of homogeneity across sectors is valid. In the IAF, there is a considerable difference 
between weighted and unweighted estimates. This suggests that there is heterogeneity 
across groups with different weights in the sample. With this in mind, the model was 
estimated using weights in the regression.  
Although this issue will not be analyzed further, it is noteworthy that Nampula 
and Zambézia Provinces have very high average weights relative to the other provinces, 
indicating that these provinces were undersampled. To the extent that the parameters of 
the “true model” of health-seeking behavior are different in these provinces, this can help 
explain the differences in parameter estimates between weighted and unweighted 
regression. Of course, provinces only provide one potential breakdown through which 
under- and oversampling can be analyzed, and these findings should only be seen as 
suggestive. 
In order to account for sample design effects on the standard errors of coefficient 
standard errors, the MNLM was estimated without assuming that observations within the 
same cluster are independent. As expected, this results in larger standard errors. Contrary 
to what would be expected, standard errors are generally larger in the estimation with   47
strata specified, although this is not true in all cases. However, in light of the small effect 
of stratification on standard errors, it is not taken into account in estimation. In this way, 




The Dependent Variable: Provider Choice 
As noted above, individuals who report having been ill in the previous four weeks 
were asked to specify whether they had a consultation and, if so, with what type of health 
care provider. The alternatives offered were (1) hospital, (2) private clinic, (3) health 
post, (4) doctor, (5) nurse, (6) pharmacy, (7) traditional medical practitioner, or (8) other. 
For the purpose of estimation, these can usefully be grouped, in particular, as the number 
of observation for some choices are small.  
As a result of this grouping, there are five possible outcomes or alternatives 
considered in estimation: (1) no care/self-care, (2) traditional medical practitioner, 
(3) hospital or doctor, (4) health post or nurse, and (5) pharmacy, private clinic, or other. 
 
Independent Variables 
Individual characteristics. There are three sets of explanatory variables in the 
Model. The individual characteristics include age, gender, education, income, wage rate, 
and health status (symptoms). Age is a continuous variable, while gender enters as a 
                                                 
46 All the variables in the estimation are defined in Appendix Table 12 and described in Appendix Tables 
13 and 14.   48
dummy variable taking the value one for women. The effect of education is captured 
through four dummy variables: no education, level 1 primary education, level 2 primary 
education, and higher than level 2 primary education. For observations where the 
individual is less than 16 years old, the education variables refer to the education of the 
mother. The education dummies are defined such that more than one of the variables can 
take the value one. Specifically, dummies for lower levels of education do not revert to 
zero when higher levels are attained. In this way, the coefficient on dummies for higher 
levels of education reflects the marginal effect of that level of education on provider 
choice (Collier, Radwan, and Wangwe 1986; Simler 1994).  
Income is proxied by estimates of total monthly per-capita household 
consumption, deflated by a spatial price index.
47 This is broadly consistent with other 
specifications in the literature. The most common approach is to use total household 
monthly income proxied by household consumption (see, for example, Gertler, Locay, 
and Sanderson 1987 or Gertler and van der Gaag 1990) or per-capita monthly 
expenditure (Lavy and Germain 1994; Litvack and Bodart 1993). In some studies, 
income has been proxied by assets (Akin et al. 1986b) or income category dummies 
(Akin, Guilkey, and Denton 1995). Acton (1975) notes that it would be desirable to 
distinguish between earned and unearned income, as the former has both income effect 
and effect from raising the opportunity cost of time. However, due to data limitations, 
most studies do not make this distinction.  
                                                 
47 Data on personal expenditure are available, but of dubious quality, due to low and uneven response rate. 
For this reason, it is not used in this analysis.    49
The wage rate enters both on its own, and as a determinant of the opportunity cost 
of time. Many studies have used community-level data on wage rates (often gender 
specific wage rate for agricultural labor) (see, for example, Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson 
1987 and Gertler and van der Gaag 1990). Because a large number of missing values for 
community wage rate in IAF, wage is proxied here by per-capita daily household 
consumption (deflated by a spatial price index and divided by 12 for hourly “wage”). 
This definition of the wage rate has the advantage that it captures within-community 
differences in wages, and it may provide a truer measure of “productivity of time.” 
Consumption is, however, endogenous, and to the extent that illness episodes result in 
reductions in consumption, this may lead to bias. 
Many studies of health care demand include a measure of health status as an 
explanatory variable. Akin, Guilkey, and Denton (1995) include symptoms and 
seriousness of illness (proxied by number of days not able to carry out tasks) in 
regression. Similarly, Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson (1987) and Gertler and van der Gaag 
(1990) include the number of days healthy in the last four weeks in the health production 
function. Lavy and Quigley (1991) use the number of days individuals report being 
unable to perform tasks. As many of these studies note, these variables are problematic in 
that they are endogenous to the health care choice. Here, symptoms are included as 
explanatory variables. There are good theoretical reasons to suspect that symptoms are an 
important determinant of whether and where individuals choose to consult, and the   50
descriptive statistics confirmed this effect.
48 Symptoms enter as nine dummy variables, 
operating as indicators for symptoms as reported by the interviewees. Categories of 
symptoms in the survey are (1) diarrhea; (2) cold, cough, breathing difficulty; (3) worms; 
(4) fever; (5) persistent cough with vomiting; (6) persistent cough with blood; (7) skin 
eruptions; (8) malaria; and (9) other. For some of these categories, the number of 
observations is small. The most frequently reported symptom category is the 
heterogeneous group “other.” 
 
  Household characteristics. Two features of the household are captured through 
the household variables. First, wealth is proxied by the number of rooms of the dwelling, 
and an indicator variable for ownership of a radio. A range of other wealth proxies was 
tried, including landholdings and vehicle (including bicycle) ownership, but they did not 
appear significant in exploratory regressions and were excluded from the model. Other 
characteristics of the dwelling, such as presence of latrine or water closet and water 
source, were not considered on the grounds that these variables not only proxy for wealth, 
but also are determinants of health status and illness incidence. Second, the number of 
members in the household was included as an explanatory variable.  
 
  Community characteristics. Three types of community variables are included as 
explanatory variables. First, an indicator variable for whether there is a rural hospital in 
                                                 
48 Reporting of symptoms may be endogenous in the sense that knowledge and understanding of symptoms 
is affected by if and where an individuals chooses to consult.   51
the district proxies for distance to hospital. As will be seen below, the community survey 
offers no information on distance to nearest hospital. This distance is proxied by distance 
to nearest doctor, and the dummy variable on whether there is a rural hospital in the 
province serves as a control for effects not captured by this proxy. 
Second, two indicator variables relating to the availability of transport to and from 
the village on a regular basis and the passability of roads throughout the year are 
included. They capture dimensions of access not necessarily reflected in the reported 
travel time to different types of health care providers. 
Third, two variables on public spending—annual current spending per attendance 
unit
49 and annual spending on medicines per capita—were included as proxies for health 
service quality. In both cases, spending data refers to district-level spending. A range of 
variables has been used in the literature to proxy for quality.
50 Akin, Guilkey, and Denton 
(1995) suggest that the best proxy for quality is operational cost per capita (based on 
reported expenditure by facility). They, note, however, that this is not a perfect measure 
due to differences in efficiency. They therefore use as additional measures observed 
physical conditions of facilities; percentage of the year drugs are available. Many other 
                                                 
49 Attendance units is a weighted index of (weights in parenthesis): days/bed occupied (9); institutional 
deliveries (12); vaccinations (0.5); maternal  and infant health contacts (1); outpatient contacts (1); 
stomatology contacts (2). Current spending includes spending on salaries, goods and services, and medical 
supplies from all sources of financing (state budget, external financing, special funds). By looking at 
current spending per attendance unit, differences in operational efficiency are partly controlled for. 
50 The usage of the term quality sometimes gets confusing. Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson (1987) and 
Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) do not derive quality from any observable characteristics of facilities. 
Quality is a provider, rather than a facility characteristic, and refers to the expected improvement in health 
status from using a particular provider. Lavy and Quigley (1991) use the term in an even more general 
sense, as simply the type of health care provider.   52
studies have used only structural and staffing characteristics of facilities as proxies for 
quality. Akin et al. (1986a) use usual attendant (and for traditional practitioners, a dummy 
for whether they treat any of five common illnesses). In contrast, Lavy and Germain 
(1994) measure quality through drug availability, staffing, and infrastructure 
characteristics. In Litvack and Bodart (1993), quality is limited to drug availability. In 
general, there is likely to be considerable collinearity between different structural quality 
variables, and Mwabu, Ainsworth, and Nyamete (1993) find that this feature of the data 
prevents them from examining the independent impact of different quality characteristics.  
Efforts to estimate the price effect without controlling for quality are problematic 
(Akin et al. 1984; 1986b; Alderman and Lavy 1996). Specifically, if higher prices are 
associated with better quality, and patients are willing to pay more for that improved 
quality, it is likely that the estimated price response will be understated. Unfortunately, 
data on infrastructural characteristics of facilities or spending by facility were not 
available for Mozambique in a form that permitted linking with household-level data. For 
this reason, quality of care only enters as a proxy (public spending) at the district level. 
 
  Attributes of alternatives. The choice attributes included in the model accord with 
the empirical specification set out above. The relevant explanatory variables are (1) price 
of care from provider j, (2) price squared, (3) a price/income interaction term, and 
(4) travel time associated with different forms of care. Price of health care from provider j 
is defined as 
   53
j j j wt f p + = , 
 
 
that is, the sum of the fee fj and the opportunity cost of time (tj) spent seeking care. 
Opportunity cost of time is proxied by the wage as defined above. The time spent seeking 
care includes both travel time and time spent waiting to receive care. Due to data 
limitations, only travel time is used as an explanatory variable. It is proxied by travel time 
as reported in the community-level survey. This refers to estimated time between a 
central point in each cluster to the respective health care provider. This is then attributed 
to households, thus imposing a measurement error
51  
Because health care providers have been grouped for the purpose of empirical 
estimation, and because the categories of health care providers used in the community 
survey do not correspond exactly with the categories used in the health section of the 
household survey, the travel time variable used in estimation rests on a number of 
assumptions. Travel time associated with no care/self-care is assumed to be zero. There is 
no information in the community survey on travel time to the nearest hospital, even 
though hospital consultation is one of the options specified in the health section of the 
household survey. Travel time to hospital is proxied by reported travel time to nearest 
doctor. The community survey contains information on distance to both nearest health 
post and nearest health center, while the health section of the household survey groups 
                                                 
51 Travel time and waiting time are also reported by users of health care providers. While these data suffer 
from less measurement error, travel time is only available for those who actually chose to consult with a 
particular health care provider. This endogeneity is a potential source of bias. Moreover, in the IAF, 
individual-level travel time and waiting time variables are characterized by high numbers of missing 
values. Community-level variables were therefore chosen as more reliable.   54
these two categories. It is assumed here that travel time can be proxied by the lowest 
value of travel time to health post and health center, respectively. For the group “other,” 
travel time to the nearest pharmacy is used as a proxy.
52 
Actual expenditure on health care consultations are only recorded for individuals 
seeking care and for the provider actually chosen, leading to a possible endogeneity 
problem if these data were used. In response to this problem, some studies have estimated 
hedonic price equations for private doctors and/or TMPs, and imputed prices for all 
individuals (see, for example, Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson 1987, Gertler and van der 
Gaag 1990, and Lavy and Quigley 1991). However, most studies opt to use official fees 
as proxies for prices. Of course, user fees often vary by form of treatment, and in most 
surveys, the form of treatment actually received is not observed. Akin, Guilkey, and 
Denton (1995) suggest that the official outpatient registration fee be used as best proxy 
for ranking of overall facility price. This procedure is followed here.  
It is assumed that the fee associated with no care/self care is zero. Similarly, it is 
assumed that the cost of a consultation with a traditional medical practitioner is zero. This 
is motivated by the observation that mode payment for consultation with a TMP is zero in 
the IAF data; more than 50 percent of the sample have not paid anything for their 
consultation at the time of the interview. Of course, TMPs often permit postponed 
payment, payment in installations, or outcome contingent payments. This casts some 
                                                 
52 Some values for travel time were corrected. This was done in two cases: (1) where the travel time was 
egregiously high relative to distance to facilities (this was the case for two villages) and (2) where reported 
travel time to a particular health care provider was zero, even though reported distance to the same type of 
health care provider was non-zero. These corrections were based on predicted values for travel time from a 
regression of travel time on distance.   55
doubt on this assumption. For hospitals and clinics, it is assumed that official fees are 
used. As noted above, there is a long range of exemptions from payments, and in-patient 
charges are considerably different from outpatient fees.
53 However, the IAF data offer no 
guidance on what type of care was sought by the patient. In other words, we only know if 
the interviewee had a consultation at a hospital or health post, and not whether he or she 
was an outpatient or inpatient or if any special procedures were required. The fee for 
medical consultations for outpatients is 1,000MT in urban areas and 500MT in rural 
areas. Finally, it assumed that the user fee associated with a consultation with a 
practitioner from the group “other” is zero. This is consistent with the observation that 
more than 60 percent of those who report seeking care from this group report not having 
paid anything at the time of the interview. Following the empirical specification, 





Full results for the estimation are reported in the Appendix. Appendix Table 15 
presents the regression outputs and Appendix Table 16 contains the marginal effects for 
                                                 
53 Individuals officially exempt from payment include  those  without  the  means to pay, women, for 
childbirth and related care, minors, combatants in the armed struggle for national liberation, blood donors, 
the disabled who cannot work, retired persons, pensioners and invalids, beneficiaries of allowances for 
blood or for other relevant services to the state, domestic servants, the unemployed, and any other persons 
who do not have means of subsistence (Barbosa 1999). There does not appear to be a systematic difference 
in actual payments for consultation at a hospital or health center according to age (child status) and gender.   56
each variable in the regression, calculated at the mean of each of the variables. These 
results and their interpretation are discussed below. Results from tests of the hypothesis 
that all coefficients associated with that variable are zero are provided in Appendix Table 
17.
54 These tests were carried out for each of the independent variables. 
In addition to tests of coefficients on specific variables, two diagnostic tests were 
performed. First, a Wald test was performed to investigate the hypothesis that the 
coefficients associated with two outcomes, m and n, are equal. If this hypothesis is true, 
the two outcomes are indistinguishable with respect to the variables in the model, and can 
be combined. This is equivalent to the null hypothesis that all the coefficients associated 
with a particular outcome m are equal to zero when the base outcome is n. This test was 
performed for all possible combinations of outcomes, and the hypothesis that there is no 
difference between coefficients was rejected in all cases. 
Second, the validity of the IIA assumption was tested. As noted above, the IIA 
assumption implies that the odds for any pair of outcomes are determined without 
reference to the other outcomes that may be available. Hausman and McFadden (1984) 
offer a Hausman-type test for testing IIA assumption. It is based on the idea that a 
consistent but inefficient estimator can be obtained by estimating the model on a 
restricted set of outcomes. The Hausman statistic measures the difference between the 
coefficients in a restricted model (with some outcomes eliminated), and those of the 
                                                 
54 Given that the model is estimated without assuming that observations within clusters are independent, 
the Wald test is appropriate. The “likelihood” for weighted or clustered MLEs should only be used for the 
computation of the point estimates and should not for variance estimation using standard formulas. This is 
because estimates produced by probit or logit commands with the cluster option are not true maximum 
likelihood estimates (StataCorp 1999).    57
original model. An alternative test is provided by Small and Hsiao (1985). The Small-
Hsiao statistic is calculated by dividing the sample into two random subsamples, 
calculating average estimates from unrestricted estimates from the two subsamples, 
estimating coefficients for a restricted model, and comparing the likelihoods of the two 
models. For the model at hand, the results from the two tests are inconsistent. The 
Hausman tests accepts the hypothesis that outcome “TMP” is independent from other 
alternatives, and rejects the hypothesis for the other alternatives. The Small-Hsiao test, on 
the other hand, rejects the hypothesis for all alternatives. In view of the inconclusiveness 
of these results, we are not able to confirm the validity of the IIA assumption. 
 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is complicated by the fact that the 
model is nonlinear in the explanatory variables. This means that the impact of 
independent variables on the probability of seeking a particular type of care will depend 
on the value of that and other independent variables. For this reason, results are best 
interpreted through the analysis of marginal effects and predicted probabilities.  
The marginal effect of variable x on alternative k refers to the change in the 
probability of individual i choosing alternative k in response to a change in x. Using the 
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where  x j, a are alternative specific coefficients associated with the variable x. As can be 
seen, the marginal effect depends on the values of all independent variables, and the 
coefficients for each outcome. Marginal effects associated with the different variables are 
reported for each of the alternatives in Appendix Table 16, and will be discussed later. 
These marginal effects are calculated at the means of all the explanatory variables. 
Predicted probabilities can be analyzed in two principal ways. First, predicted 
probabilities can be calculated for each individual, given the values of the independent 
variables associated with that individual. Specifically, the predicted probability that 
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where 
* ˆ V  is evaluated is the predicted conditional utility evaluated at the values of the 
explanatory variables of individual i.  
Predicted probabilities vary across observations in the sample, and the mean, 
median, and spread of these predicted probabilities (for the sample or groups within the 
sample) can usefully be analyzed. However, insofar as we are interested in differences 
across different subgroups of the population, predicted probabilities do not shed any light 
on what feature of the subgroup is causing observed differences. In other words, without 
controlling for variation in the independent variables across subgroups, the effect of a 
particular variable cannot be distinguished. For example, if we want to look at differences 
in probabilities of seeking different types of care across gender, we want to distinguish   59
between the effect from differences in individual, household, and community 
characteristics of men and women, and the effect from the gender dummy in the 
estimated equation. If we compare mean predicted probabilities for men and women, we 
are confounding these effects. A second approach to looking at predicted probabilities 
therefore controls for variation in all the independent variables except the one of interest. 
Predicted probabilities are calculated for a representative individuals, for which the 
values of the independent values are fixed at specific levels—such as minimum, 
maximum, mean, or median—for the sample or subsamples.  
These two ways of analyzing the regression results are illustrated in Figure 1. The 
chart shows the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventy-fifth percentiles of predicted 
probabilities. As a point of comparison, the predicted probabilities evaluated at the mean 
of the independent variables are included.
55 There are two main points to note in respect 
of these results. First, although much of the discussion to follow will focus on mean 
predicted probabilities, there is a significant variation in predicted probabilities across 
different members of the sample. Second, because of the nonlinearities in the mapping 
between independent variables into probability space, predicted probabilities at averages 
are not, in general, equal to average predicted probabilities. The same holds true for 
marginal effects; depending on the distribution of the independent variables across the 
observations in the sample, marginal effects evaluated at means may be considerably 
different from mean marginal effects. With this in mind, Train (1986) warns against 
                                                 
55 More specifically, all variables are at weighted means for the rural subsample (ill and non-ill), ex cept 
age and wage, for which medians are used.   60
using responses for an average representative individual as a proxy for average response 
across observations in the sample.  
 


















THE EFFECT OF INDIVIDUAL AND HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
Age 
Higher age tends to be associated with an increase in the probability of seeking 
care from a TMP and a decrease in the probability of care being sought at a hospital or 
health post. Evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables, this effect is only 
significant for the alternatives “hospital” and “health post.” This effect is illustrated in 
Figure 2, which shows the mean predicted probabilities for different age groups. As can 
be seen, the most important effect is a shift away from consultation at a health post to no 
consultation as age increases.  
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In the discussion of descriptive statistics, it was noted that both reporting of and 
the response to illness was similar for men and women. This is confirmed by the 
regression results, and the hypothesis that all coefficients on gender are equal to zero 
cannot be rejected. Looking at the marginal effect of gender at means, the only significant 
(10 percent significance level) effect is on the alternative “hospital,” which indicates that, 
ceteris paribus, women are more likely to seek care at a hospital relative to the alternative 
“no care.” 
 
Education and Literacy 
The effect of education enters through three indicator variables in the regression, 
each respectively capturing the marginal effect of having level 1 primary education, level 
2 primary education, and more education, relative to the case of no education. For all   62
three variables, the hypothesis that all the coefficients associated with the respective 
variable are simultaneously zero is rejected. Level 1 primary education has the expected 
effect of making it more likely that an individual seeks care at a hospital or health post 
relative to the alternative “no care.” As can be seen in Appendix Table 16, the marginal 
effect at means is large and significant (10 percent significance level for hospital, 5 
percent for health post). The marginal effect of acquiring education over and above level 
1 primary is less clear. The results suggest that level 2 primary education tends to reduce 
the probability of having a consultation in a hospital or health post in the event of illness, 
though the effect is only significant for the alternative “hospital” (10 percent significance 
level). Conversely, the probability of seeking care from a TMP or “other” health care 
provider increases (not significant). This counterintuitive finding may be explained in 
part by the small number of observations with more than level 1 primary education There 
are only a few observations of individuals with more than level 1 primary education who 
report illness (84 and 14, respectively, for level 2 primary and higher). Still, although the 
negative effect of education beyond level 1 primary on the probability of seeking care in 
the public sector may be due to anomalies in the data, the findings do suggest that the 
first years of schooling are most important in shaping health-seeking behavior. The 
marginal effect at means of acquiring “more education” is, however, as expected; the 
probability of consulting with a TMP decreases while the probability of seeking care at a 
hospital or health center increases (significant at 5 percent level in all cases). The effects 
of education are illustrated in Figure 3, where mean predicted probabilities for health-
seeking behavior are plotted against the level of education achieved. The effects of   63
education do not change substantially if variation in other explanatory variables is 
controlled for. 
 


















Literacy does not have an effect on health-seeking behavior independently from 
the effect of education. The hypothesis that all coefficients associated with literacy are 
simultaneously zero is rejected (10 percent significance level). However, looking at the 
marginal effect of literacy at means, the effect is only significant for the TMP alternative, 
where literacy lowers the probability of having a consultation with a TMP relative to the 
alternative “no consultation.” Notably, even though the pattern of health-seeking 
behavior is different for the literate and illiterate subsample, these differences do not 
persist if variation in the other explanatory variables across these groups is controlled for. 
 
Income 
One of the surprising features of the descriptive statistics was that health-seeking 
behavior did not appear to be significantly different between poor and nonpoor segments   64
of the sample. This finding is confirmed by the regression results; the marginal effect of 
income at means is significant only for the alternative “other.” However, the coefficients 
on the income variable offer only a partial perspective on the effect of income. Analyzing 
the full effect of income on health-seeking behavior is complicated by the complex way 
through which income enters the estimated model. As can be seen from the variable 
definitions in Appendix Table 12, income, proxied by monthly consumption, enters 
directly, but also through the income-price interaction term, and, at the community level, 
through the opportunity cost of time. As was discussed in Section 4, the interaction term 
arises from the inclusion of quadratic residual consumption in the indirect utility 
function, and is there to permit the demand effect of price to vary with income. This 
feature of the model is discussed further below. 
Figure 4 graphs mean predicted probabilities by income quintile. As can be seen, 
the effect of income is in the expected direction, with higher income making it more 
likely that individuals will consult at a hospital or health post, but the effect is quite 
small.  
Figure 5 contrasts the mean predicted probabilities for the different income 
quintiles with the case where variation in other explanatory variables are controlled for. 
In the latter case, all the explanatory variables are held at the sample mean, except 
income, for which the quintile mean is used.  
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Symptoms 
Reported symptoms appear to be important determinants of health-seeking 
behavior. For all symptoms except “worm” and “malaria,” the hypothesis that all the   66
coefficients associated with the indicator variable for the respective symptom are zero is 
rejected (10 percent significance). As expected, the effects differ between the symptoms 
and can be illustrated by the marginal effects at means (Appendix Table 16). Focusing on 
significant effects, we find that the probability of seeking care from a TMP falls in the 
case where reported symptom is “cold, cough, or breathing difficulty,” “fever,” or 
“persistent cough with blood” relative to the case where “other” symptoms are reported. 
Similarly, the marginal effect of “diarrhea,” “cold, cough and breathing difficulty,” 
“fever,” “persistent cough with vomiting,” and “skin eruptions” on the probability of 
having a consultation in a hospital is negative and significant relative to the case where 
“other” symptoms are suffered. In contrast, the marginal effect at means of the symptom 
“diarrhea” on seeking care from a health post is positive, large, and significant.  
 
Dwelling and Household Characteristics 
The number of rooms of the household dwelling and an indicator variable for 
ownership of a radio are used to proxy for household wealth. In the case of radio 
ownership, the hypothesis that all the coefficients associated with the variable are 
simultaneously zero cannot be rejected, whereas the equivalent hypothesis is rejected (10 
percent significance) for the number of rooms. Considering marginal effects at means, the 
effect of an increase in the number of rooms of the dwelling is positive and significant on 
the probability of having a consultation at a hospital in the event of an illness. For the 
other alternatives, the marginal effect is not significant.   67
The number of members of the household is a significant determinant of health-
seeking behavior. However, although the hypothesis that all the coefficients associated 
with this variable are simultaneously zero is rejected, there is only a significant marginal 
effect at means for the alternative “health post,” whereby a larger household is associated 
with a higher probability of having a consultation at a health post.  
 
THE EFFECT OF COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS 
The estimated equation includes variables capturing a number of community 
characteristics. First, indicator variables for passability of roads and the availability of 
transport to and from the village capture dimensions of physical access beyond distance. 
The hypothesis that the coefficients associated the variable of road passability are zero 
cannot be rejected. Conversely, the availability of transport is a significant determinant of 
health-seeking behavior. Considering the marginal effect at means of transport 
availability, there is a significant positive effect on the probability of seeking care from a 
TMP, and a significant negative effect on the probability of having a consultation at a 
hospital. This counterintuitive effect is most likely an artifact of the data. The presence of 
a rural hospital in the district does not appear to be a significant determinant.  
In the estimated equation, public spending per attendance unit and spending on 
medicines per capita proxies for quality of public health care (by district). As has been 
noted, expenditure is an imperfect proxy, and it captures both supply and demand   68
factors.
56 Both variables are significant determinants of health-seeking behavior in the 
data, but the effects are not those expected. Higher current spending per attendance unit is 
associated with a higher probability of seeking care from a TMP and lower probability of 
having a consultation at a health post or of having no consultation. To investigate 
whether these results were driven by outliers in the data, the model was estimated using a 
sample from which extreme values had been dropped. This largely eliminates the strong 
positive effect of current spending per attendance unit on the probability of seeking care 
from a TMP, and the salient effect becomes a tendency to shift from health post to 
hospital care as spending increases. More reasonably, higher spending on medicines per 
capita tends to be associated with a higher probability of having a consultation at a 
hospital and, conversely, a lower probability of seeking care at a health post. These 
patterns are similar if we look at the marginal effects at means of public spending 
(Appendix Table 16).  
These results should not be interpreted as suggesting that a given percentage 
increase in current spending per capita per attendance units and spending on medicines 
per capita in health posts and hospitals would result in a shift in the health-seeking 
behavior of individuals away from health posts towards hospitals. The spending data for 
hospitals and health posts used in estimation are aggregated. Given the different 
composition of services provided at hospitals and health posts, and higher overheads and 
                                                 
56 That is, higher spending per attendance unit per capita not only reflects the unit cost (and presumably 
quality) of services provided, but also the composition of services provided. In this way, the pattern of 
demand influences the variable that we use as a determinant of demand.   69
personnel costs at health posts, we would expect unit costs to be higher at hospitals, and 
spending per attendance unit or per capita to be higher in districts where hospitals are 
located. In this way, we confound the effect of spending at different levels of health care 
provision. Moreover, because of a combination of measurement error in the spending 
data and the small number of observations at the district level, these results may represent 
anomalies in the data rather than “true” effects. 
 
THE EFFECT OF TRAVEL TIME AND PRICE 
As with income, price enters the estimated equation in complex ways. First, 
looking at the coefficients on the simple price variables (price_2-price_5), we find that 
they are significantly different from zero only for the alternatives “health post” and 
“other.” Conversely, the coefficients on the squared price variables (price2_2-price2_5) 
are significant determinants of choice only for “hospital” and “health post,” while the 
price-income interaction terms (cspr_ia1-cspr_ia5) are significantly different from zero 
for all alternatives except TMP. Finally, travel time does not appear significant 
independently of its effect through the time variables. Due to the relaxation of the 
assumption of additive separability through the introduction of an interaction term 
between income and health improvements in the utility function, the restriction that 
coefficients on the respective price variables are equal across alternatives is relaxed. 
Similarly, the introduction of flexibility in the parameterization of the budget constraint   70
results in the restriction on the coefficients on  6 a and  7 a being relaxed. Both of these 
dimensions of flexibility are important in the model. 
Given the different channels through which price affects health-seeking behavior, 
the coefficients on the respective variables are difficult to interpret. It facilitates 
interpretation to look at the price elasticities of demand. Following Train (1986), the 
elasticity of the choice probability  ) 1 Pr( = k V with respect to the a change in the price pk 
is defined as 
 











































Analogous to the case of continuous demand, the elasticity represents the 
percentage change in the probability of having a consultation with provider k due to a 
percentage change in price of consultation with provider k, where the percentage change 
in price is infinitesimal. Own price elasticities were calculated for “hospital” and “health 
post” for all the observations in the sample. The results are reported by income quintile in 
Table 11. Given the semi-quadratic specification of the utility function, the elasticity is a 
function of income. The results are similar to those found in other studies.
57  
Two features of the reported demand elasticities are particularly noteworthy. First, 
there is considerable variation in the elasticity of demand within income quintiles, 
particularly in the case of “health post.” Second, the elasticity of demand varies 
                                                 
57 See Gertler and Hammer (1997) for a review of findings.   71
Table 11: Own price elasticities, by income quintile 
Income quintile  P25  Mean  p75 
Health post 
1  -0.92  -0.74  -0.47 
2  -0.86  -0.64  -0.42 
3  -0.84  -0.63  -0.41 
4  -0.82  -0.59  -0.39 
5  -0.69  -0.47  -0.32 
Hospital 
1  -0.39  -0.34  -0.21 
2  -0.46  -0.42  -0.26 
3  -0.59  -0.58  -0.32 
4  -0.73  -0.70  -0.35 
5  -1.00  -0.95  -0.41 
 
 
substantially with income. In the case on demand for care at a “health post,” the elasticity 
is higher for households with lower incomes, indicating that an increase in prices is likely 
to reduce access to care particularly for poorer households. Conversely, the own price 
elasticity of demand for hospital care increases with income. This suggests that the 
demand response to price increases would be strongest among richer households. 
 
POLICY SIMULATIONS 
As was noted in the introduction, many policy initiatives in the health sector in 
developing countries have been aimed at increasing the access to or utilization of basic 
health services, particularly by poor segments of the population. With this objective in 
mind, the regression results were used to simulate the impact of a range of policy 
changes. Clearly, there is an infinite number of permutations of policy changes that can 
be considered, and the presentation of results is limited to a few indicative cases.    72
It should be noted that these simulations only consider one round of effects. In 
other words, they should be regarded as representing only a partial equilibrium. The 
effects of a policy change are simulated by changing the values of one or more of the 
explanatory variables in accord with the policy in question. The changes in the 
explanatory variables result in changes in the predicted probabilities, and these are taken 
to be the effect of the policy. However, second and higher order effects, that is, 
endogenous effects on other explanatory variables or preferences in response to the 
policy change, are not considered. For example, we can simulate a change in user charges 
for consultations at a health post by changing the value of this variable and compute a 
new set of predicted probabilities. Higher user charges may, however, result in an 
improvement in quality or a response by private sector providers that may have a 
considerable effect on health-seeking behavior. This limitation should be kept in mind in 
the discussion that follows.  
The effect of universal primary education and complete physical access to health 
care are two policies on health-seeking behavior examined in Figure 6. Specifically, 
mean predicted probabilities are computed for two alternative scenarios. In the first case, 
physical access to basic care is extended to all individuals, in the sense that the distance 
to nearest health post is reduced to zero; in the second scenario, all individuals are 
assumed to have level 1 primary education. Under both scenarios, the desired results of 
reducing the number of individuals who receive no treatment or self-treat is achieved. 
However, the effect is larger in the case of universal primary education, in part because  
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under this scenario, the probability of consultation at a hospital and a health post both 
increase, whereas under universal access to primary care, there is a substitution away 
from hospitals. 
A second simulation considers the effect of complete eradication of income 
poverty (Figure 7). Under this scenario, the income of all individuals who fall below the 
poverty line is raised to the poverty line. Aside from the income variable itself, this has 
an impact on the price-income interaction term and the opportunity cost of time. In 
keeping with the finding that income is not an important determinant of health-seeking 
behavior, the mean predicted probabilities are virtually unchanged under this scenario. In 
other words, it appears that, ceteris paribus, the eradication of income poverty would not 
resolve low access to public health care. 
Finally, the effect of changes in user charges is examined (Figure 8). Specifically, 
two scenarios are considered, one in which the fee for care at health posts is reduced to 
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zero, and a second in which the fees associated with a consultation at health post or 
hospital are both set to 5,000MT. Though these are large percentage changes relative to 
the current level of 1,000MT, the absolute amounts involved are quite small. Still, the 
simulated changes in predicted probabilities are substantial. The elimination of user 
charges at health posts increases the mean predicted probability of seeking care at a 
health post by more than 10 percent and concomitantly reduces the probability that the 
individual receives no care or self-treats. Conversely, in the simulation, even a relatively 
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modest increase in user fees at public facilities results in a large reduction in health care 
demand, and an increase in the probability that individuals do not consult with a medical 
practitioner in the event of illness. 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to investigate the determinants of access to public health 
care facilities in Mozambique, and to provide some quantitative evidence on the 
importance of individual, household, and community characteristics on individuals’ care-
seeking decisions during episodes of illness. Through the application of rigorous 
economic methodology in the analysis of this issue, the research provides new empirical 
evidence on how different factors affect health-seeking behavior.  
The health sector in Mozambique has long suffered from adverse conditions, low 
levels of financing, and limited technical capacity. Still, recent years have seen a dramatic 
expansion of the rural health network aimed at increasing access to health services for the 
population. Given years of colonial neglect, and systematic destruction of health facilities 
during the civil war, the need for an expansion of physical access is apparent. However, 
insofar as the ultimate objective of the provision of curative services is to ensure that 
those in need of care receive effective treatment, it is also necessary to think beyond 
supply. Specifically, we need to consider how individuals behave during episodes of 
illness, and what factors affect this behavior. There are likely to be a range of policy 
trade-offs—for example, between physical access to care and quality, or between   76
investments in the health network and policy initiatives in related sectors—that are likely 
to be overlooked if demand issues are ignored.  
With this perspective in mind, the paper has reported descriptive statistics and 
results from empirical analysis based on the 1996/97 Mozambican household survey. As 
was noted, the data suffer from many weaknesses, particularly on health variables, and 
offers a very limited perspective on complex individual and household responses during 
illness episodes. Still, the IAF was the first national household living standards survey 
fielded since the end of the civil war, and due to the size of the sample and the fact that it 
is representative at both national and provincial levels, it constitutes the most relevant 
source of data at this point in time. 
The descriptive statistics in Section 3 look at evidence on illness prevalence, the 
decision to seek care, and the choice of health care provider. Consistent with evidence on 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (see, e.g., GoM et al. 1998), the data 
suggest that illness prevalence and health-seeking behavior vary considerably across 
provinces. More surprisingly, reporting of illness and illness response varies little with 
income, or between men and women.  
In order to shed more light on the importance of individual, household, and 
community factors on health care demand, an empirical model to estimate a multinomial 
model of health care provider choice conditional on illness was specified in Section 4. 
The model is consistent with the “flexible” specification proposed by Dow (1996a). A 
number of individual and household characteristics—e.g., age, education, and reported 
symptoms—stand out as highly significant determinants of health-seeking behavior. For   77
lack of suitable quality characteristics of health care providers, data on current public 
spending and spending on medicines by district were used as a proxy. However, these 
data failed to disaggregate spending in hospitals from spending at health centers and 
health posts, and results appear to reflect the location of hospitals and different 
composition of services at hospitals and health posts, rather than endogenous behavior, 
given some exogenous allocation of public resources. Finally, prices, defined in the 
model as the composite of user fees and time costs associated with consultations at 
different providers, were found to be important determinants of choice. Specifically, 
average own price elasticities ranging from 0.47 and 0.74 (health post), and 0.34 and 0.95 
(hospital) were found, where elasticities decreased with income for the alternative health 
post and increased with income for the alternative hospital.  
A number of weaknesses pertaining to the data and the methodology should be 
kept in mind when the results in this paper are considered. First, it was noted that the 
household survey fails to capture many of the complexities that characterize individual 
and household responses to illness episodes. Also, we are required to treat income as 
exogenous, thereby ignoring the possibly deleterious effect of income loss on households, 
and the data do not permit an analysis of household strategies to deal with income loss 
and the cost of care. Second, poor quality of health care may be an important constraint 
on demand for health services from the public sector. Differences in quality across 
facilities are not controlled for in the estimation, and we are unable to determine the 
extent to which different quality characteristics—such as drug availability, structural 
characteristics, and staffing—are important determinants of health-seeking behavior.   78
Finally, the empirical model is based on the assumption of utility maximization. In other 
words, we are assuming that the observed patterns of behavior represent optima, given 
the values of the explanatory variables, and, consequently, that individuals would, on 
average, respond to changes in the explanatory variables in a manner consistent with the 
estimated results. However, insofar as the assumptions are not correct, the findings may 
also be misleading.  
Notwithstanding these qualifications, some strong results emerge from the 
research. In particular, the data suggest that even relatively small price changes would 
have a substantial impact on access to public health care, in particular for poorer 
households. We also find that level 1 primary education has a very strong positive effect 
on the probability of individuals seeking care at a health post or hospital in the event of 
illness. Conversely, the results indicate that the eradication of income poverty, 
independent of improvements in physical access to health care or education, has only a 
negligible effect on health care choices. In the absence of information on costs of 
different policies aimed at improving access to health care, their relative merits cannot be 
evaluated. Nonetheless, the results in this paper offer some strong indicative results that 
can inform and motivate future research.  
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Table 12: Definition of variables in estimation 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE          
Provider choice       
prv_ch=1  no consultation       
prv_ch=2  TMP       
prv_ch=3  hospital       
prv_ch=4  health post/center       
prv_ch=5  other       
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES          
Individual characteristics    Annual district spending 
idd  age (years)    csp_ua  current spending/attendance unit (MT)
c,d 
female  gender (prop. women)    msp_pop  spending on medicines per capita (MT) 
edu_no  no education (0/1)
a     
edu_pr1  primary, level 1 (0/1)
a    Price (j) (user fee (j) + wage * time_j) 
edu_pr2  primary, level 2 (0/1)
a    price_1  no care 
edu_more  secondary or higher (0/1)
a    price_2  TMP 
mnth_cns  log monthly consumption (MT)
b    price_3  hospital 
wage  hourly wage rate based on HH income    price_4  health center/post 
      price_5  other 
Symptoms         
sint_1  diarrhea    Price^2 (j)   
sint_2  cold, cough, breathing difficulty    price2_1  no care 
sint_3  worm    price2_2  TMP 
sint_4  fever    price2_3  hospital 
sint_5  persistent cough w. vomiting    price2_4  health center/post 
sint_6  persistent cough w. blood    price2_5  other 
sint_7  skin eruptions     
sint_8  malaria    Income / price interaction term 
sint_9  other    cspr_ia1  mnth_cns*price_1 
      cspr_ia2  mnth_cns*price_2 
Household characteristics    cspr_ia3  mnth_cns*price_3 
divis  number of rooms in dwelling    cspr_ia4  mnth_cns*price_4 
d_rad  household owns a radio (% yes)    cspr_ia5  mnth_cns*price_5 
no_memb  household size       
      Travel time to health care provider 
Community characteristics    time_1  no care 
HRinDis  rural hospital in district (prop. yes)    time_2  TMP 
transit  roads to/from village passable t/o year (0/1)    time_3  hospital 
transp  there is regular transport to/from village (0/1)    time_4  health center/post 
       time_5  other 
a education (variable refers to education of mother if less than 16 years old). 
b  based on estimate of total daily per capita household consumption, deflated by a spatial price index and multiplied by 
30. 
c attendance units are a weighted (by average time spent by staff - weights in parenthesis) index of days/bed occupied 
(9); institutional deliveries (12); vaccinations (0.5); maternal and infant health contacts (1); outpatient contacts (1); 
stomatology contacts (2). 
d current spending including spending on salaries, goods and services, and medical supplies (including medicines) from 
all sources of financing (state budget, external financing, special funds). 
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Table 13: Description of variables in estimation (rural subsample) 
Variable  Description  n  Mean  S.D.  Min  0.25  Mdn  0.75  Max 
                   
idd  age  25,030  22.34 18.42 0  7.76 16.53 33.54  95.99
female  gender  25,030  0.52 0.5 0  0 1 1  1
edu_no  no education  25,030  0.88 0.32 0  1 1 1  1
edu_pr1  primary lvl. 1  25,030  0.12 0.32 0  0 0 0  1
edu_pr2  primary lvl. 2  25,030  0.03 0.16 0  0 0 0  1
edu_more  secondary or higher  25,030  0 0.06 0  0 0 0  1
mnth_cns  ln monthly consumption  25,030  11.67 0.65 9.1  11.26 11.65 12.07  15.16
wage  wage  2,907  0.17 0.38 0  0 0 0  1
sint_1  diarrhea  2,907  0.08 0.27 0  0 0 0  1
sint_2  cold, etc.  2,907  0.01 0.12 0  0 0 0  1
sint_3  worm  2,907  0.08 0.27 0  0 0 0  1
sint_4  fever  2,907  0.03 0.16 0  0 0 0  1
sint_5  cough, vomiting  2,907  0.01 0.12 0  0 0 0  1
sint_6  cough, blood  2,907  0.04 0.19 0  0 0 0  1
sint_7  skin eruptions  2,907  0.22 0.41 0  0 0 0  1
sint_8  malaria  2,907  0.37 0.48 0  0 0 1  1
sint_9  other  25,030  409.25 209.48 77.09  266.21 367.03 496.98  1553.54
divis  number rooms  25,030  2.79 1.35 0  2 3 4  11
d_rad  radio  25,030  0.27 0.45 0  0 0 1  1
no_memb  household size  25,030  5.98 2.79 1  4 6 7  20
HRinDis  rural hospital in dist.  25,030  0.36 0.48 0  0 0 1  1
transit  road passable  25,030  0.31 0.46 0  0 0 1  1
transp  regular transport  25,030  0.77 0.42 0  1 1 1  1
csp_ua  curr. spend./attend. unit  25,030  4.92 2.73 1.12  3.31 4.77 5.68  22.27
msp_pop  drugs spend. per cap.  25,030  3.85 4.19 0.46  1.47 2.41 4.44  25.94
price_1  no care  25,030  0 0 0  0 0 0  0
price_2  TMP  25,030  0.07 0.56 0  0 0 0  11.03
price_3  hospital  25,030  3.03 3.1 1  1.45 2.12 3.17  27.56
price_4  health center/post  25,030  1.98 1.56 1  1.09 1.45 2.23  13.78
price_5  other  25,030  0.72 0.99 0  0.18 0.44 0.88  10.32
price2_1  no care  25,030  0 0 0  0 0 0  0
price2_2  TMP  25,030  0.31 4.29 0  0 0 0  121.71
price2_3  hospital  25,030  18.77 59.91 1  2.09 4.49 10.04  759.37
price2_4  health center/post  25,030  6.35 17.19 1  1.19 2.09 4.97  189.85
price2_5  other  25,030  1.5 6.51 0  0.03 0.19 0.77  106.46
cspr_ia1  no care  25,030  0 0 0  0 0 0  0
cspr_ia2  TMP  25,030  0.85 6.7 0  0 0 0  133.98
cspr_ia3  hospital  25,030  35.58 37.12 10.43  16.85 24.28 37.46  373.29
cspr_ia4  health center/post  25,030  23.13 18.56 9.1  12.79 16.88 26.21  178.07
cspr_ia5  other  25,030  8.5 11.8 0  2.14 5.21 10.09  144.6
time_1  no care  25,030  0 0 0  0 0 0  0
time_2  TMP  25,030  0.17 2.11 0  0 0 0  72
time_3  hospital  25,030  5.51 8.08 0  1.33 3 5.55  96
time_4  health center/post  25,030  2.76 4.67 0  0.25 1.33 3.5  72
time_5  other  25,030  2.05 2.93 0  0.5 1.25 2.5  36
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Table 14: Description of variables in estimation (subsample of rural and ill) 
Variable  Description  n  Mean  S.D.  Min  0.25  Mdn  0.75  Max 
                   
idd  age  2,907  26.12 21.62 0.05  5.51 22.52 42.83  87.45
female  gender  2,907  0.57 0.49 0  0 1 1  1
edu_no  no education  2,907  0.9 0.3 0  1 1 1  1
edu_pr1  primary lvl. 1  2,907  0.1 0.3 0  0 0 0  1
edu_pr2  primary lvl. 2  2,907  0.02 0.15 0  0 0 0  1
edu_more  secondary or higher  2,907  0 0.04 0  0 0 0  1
mnth_cns  ln monthly consumption  2,907  11.78 0.65 9.33  11.36 11.78 12.19  14.95
wage  wage  2,907  0.17 0.38 0  0 0 0  1
sint_1  diarrhea  2,907  0.08 0.27 0  0 0 0  1
sint_2  cold, etc.  2,907  0.01 0.12 0  0 0 0  1
sint_3  worm  2,907  0.08 0.27 0  0 0 0  1
sint_4  fever  2,907  0.03 0.16 0  0 0 0  1
sint_5  cough, vomiting  2,907  0.01 0.12 0  0 0 0  1
sint_6  cough, blood  2,907  0.04 0.19 0  0 0 0  1
sint_7  skin eruptions  2,907  0.22 0.41 0  0 0 0  1
sint_8  malaria  2,907  0.37 0.48 0  0 0 1  1
sint_9  other  2,907  423.13 209.97 77.09  285.38 381.88 518.61  1553.54
divis  number rooms  2,907  2.69 1.32 0  2 3 3  10
d_rad  radio  2,907  0.26 0.44 0  0 0 1  1
no_memb  household size  2,907  5.15 2.66 1  3 5 7  19
HRinDis  rural hospital in dist.  2,907  0.3 0.46 0  0 0 1  1
transit  road passable  2,907  0.3 0.46 0  0 0 1  1
transp  regular transport  2,907  0.8 0.4 0  1 1 1  1
csp_ua  curr. spend./attend. unit  2,907  4.89 2.82 1.12  3.24 4.77 5.87  22.27
msp_pop  drugs spend. per cap.  2,907  3.8 4.51 0.46  1.49 2.04 3.84  25.94
price_1  no care  2,907  0 0 0  0 0 0  0
price_2  TMP  2,907  0.1 0.61 0  0 0 0  11.03
price_3  hospital  2,907  3.31 3.47 1  1.55 2.18 3.39  25.35
price_4  health center/post  2,907  1.97 1.71 1  1.06 1.44 2.2  13.78
price_5  other  2,907  0.72 0.99 0  0.2 0.44 0.84  10.32
price2_1  no care  2,907  0 0 0  0 0 0  0
price2_2  TMP  2,907  0.39 4.74 0  0 0 0  121.71
price2_3  hospital  2,907  22.96 67.11 1  2.41 4.74 11.46  642.56
price2_4  health center/post  2,907  6.81 21.11 1  1.13 2.06 4.82  189.85
price2_5  other  2,907  1.5 6.06 0  0.04 0.2 0.7  106.46
cspr_ia1  no care  2,907  0 0 0  0 0 0  0
cspr_ia2  TMP  2,907  1.19 7.29 0  0 0 0  124.66
cspr_ia3  hospital  2,907  39.14 41.62 10.66  18.03 25.87 39.36  315.08
cspr_ia4  health center/post  2,907  23.22 20.39 9.84  12.81 16.89 26.14  173.69
cspr_ia5  other  2,907  8.51 11.89 0  2.33 5.24 9.58  131.46
time_1  no care  2,907  0 0 0  0 0 0  0
time_2  TMP  2,907  0.25 2.54 0  0 0 0  72
time_3  hospital  2,907  6.06 8.65 0  1.5 3 6.17  72
time_4  health center/post  2,907  2.69 4.96 0  0.17 1.17 3  72
time_5  other  2,907  1.98 2.82 0  0.5 1.25 2.25  36
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Table 15: Estimation results (standard coefficients)  
     TMP     Hospital     Post     Other 
Variable    coef.  s.e.    coef.  s.e.    coef.  s.e.    coef.  s.e. 
                         
idd    0.002  0.324    -0.011  (2.837)**   -0.012  (3.623)**    -0.002  -0.321 
female    -0.179  -0.893    0.220  1.375    -0.036  -0.269    -0.055  -0.170 
edu_pr1    0.631  1.354    0.877  (3.128)**   0.865  (3.134)**    1.203  (1.76)* 
edu_pr2    -0.300  -0.320    -1.190  (2.299)**   -0.727  -1.333    1.565  1.589 
edu_more    -30.202  (22.324)**    1.742  1.622    -0.721  -0.522    -31.254  (20.185)** 
mnth_cns    -0.172  -0.730    0.300  1.479    0.076  0.429    -1.195  (1.798)* 
wage    0.001  1.028    0.001  (1.706)*    0.000  0.824    0.002  1.486 
sint_1    -0.071  -0.183    -0.412  (1.806)*    0.681  (2.15)**    1.283  (2.299)** 
sint_2    -1.228  (3.577)**    -0.806  (2.598)**   -0.454  (1.835)*    0.211  0.410 
sint_3    -0.927  -1.622    -0.747  -1.139    -0.058  -0.104    0.382  0.329 
sint_4    -0.811  (2.1)**    -0.733  (1.95)*    -0.072  -0.198    0.519  1.048 
sint_5    -0.609  -1.147    -1.262  (2.45)**    -0.020  -0.055    -0.240  -0.240 
sint_6    -2.126  (2.067)**    -0.046  -0.088    -0.115  -0.219    -28.955  (55.607)** 
sint_7    -0.552  -1.141    -1.360  (2.122)**   -0.282  -1.024    -29.141  (53.621)** 
sint_8    -0.208  -0.852    -0.110  -0.476    0.044  0.237    -0.053  -0.105 
divis    -0.099  -1.306    0.134  (2.496)**   -0.006  -0.099    0.095  0.759 
d_rad    0.176  0.553    0.211  1.110    -0.164  -1.057    0.498  1.002 
lit    -0.547  (1.877)*    0.309  1.273    0.153  0.727    -0.496  -1.019 
no_memb    -0.013  -0.330    0.043  1.175    0.091  (3.111)**    0.109  1.287 
HRinDis    -0.196  -0.623    0.071  0.284    0.347  1.605    0.490  1.056 
transit    0.045  0.216    -0.116  -0.470    -0.125  -0.707    -0.091  -0.180 
transp    0.777  (2.776)**    -0.408  (1.816)*    -0.008  -0.035    0.268  0.531 
csp_ua    0.106  (2.426)**    0.027  0.541    -0.071  -1.468    -0.262  (2.331)** 
msp_pop    -0.081  (2.724)**    0.043  1.557    -0.029  -0.773    0.114  (2.075)** 
price_2    -3.971  -1.508    (dropped)      (dropped)      (dropped)   
price_3    (dropped)      0.690  1.321    (dropped)      (dropped)   
price_4    (dropped)      (dropped)      -1.835  (3.014)**    (dropped)   
price_5    (dropped)      (dropped)      (dropped)      -12.797  (2.117)** 
price2_2    -0.015  -0.197    (dropped)      (dropped)      (dropped)   
price2_3    (dropped)      0.016  (2.546)**   (dropped)      (dropped)   
price2_4    (dropped)      (dropped)      0.039  (3.472)**    (dropped)   
price2_5    (dropped)      (dropped)      (dropped)      -0.065  -0.619 
cspr_ia2    0.299  1.452    (dropped)      (dropped)      (dropped)   
cspr_ia3    (dropped)      -0.085  (2.264)**   (dropped)      (dropped)   
cspr_ia4    (dropped)      (dropped)      0.095  (2.034)**    (dropped)   
cspr_ia5    (dropped)      (dropped)      (dropped)      0.972  (1.985)** 
time_2    0.128  1.017    (dropped)      (dropped)      (dropped)   
time_3    (dropped)      -0.039  -0.720    (dropped)      (dropped)   
time_4    (dropped)      (dropped)      0.013  0.323    (dropped)   
time_5    (dropped)      (dropped)      (dropped)      0.378  (2.366)** 
_cons    0.017  0.007    -4.792  (2.025)**   -0.128  -0.062    9.345  1.222 
                                      
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.                   
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level.                 84
Table 16: Estimation results (marginal effects) 
     TMP     Hospital     Post     Other 
Variable    coef.  s.e.    coef.  s.e.    coef.  s.e.    coef.  s.e. 
                         
idd    0.001  1.525    -0.001  (1.653)*    -0.002  (3.064)**    0.000  0.392 
female    -0.016  -1.016    0.025  (1.65)*    -0.011  -0.407    0.000  -0.158 
edu_pr1    0.016  0.453    0.048  (1.952)*    0.139  (2.556)**    0.002  1.153 
edu_pr2    0.009  0.118    -0.089  (1.667)*    -0.110  -0.957    0.006  (1.989)**
edu_more    -2.420  (9.739)**    0.510  (4.396)**   0.691  (2.416)**    -0.085  (3.971)**
mnth_cns    -0.019  -0.955    0.029  1.484    0.012  0.300    -0.004  (2.014)**
wage    0.000  0.682    0.000  1.438    0.000  0.086    0.000  1.237 
sint_1    -0.022  -0.899    -0.066  (2.598)**   0.167  (2.646)**    0.003  (2.206)**
sint_2    -0.078  (2.86)**    -0.051  (1.796)*    -0.035  -0.658    0.002  1.066 
sint_3    -0.066  -1.500    -0.063  -1.113    0.042  0.385    0.002  0.477 
sint_4    -0.056  (1.872)*    -0.062  (2.011)**   0.035  0.495    0.002  1.641 
sint_5    -0.036  -0.940    -0.119  (2.367)**   0.060  0.860    0.000  -0.038 
sint_6    -0.160  (1.979)**    0.031  0.683    0.067  0.625    -0.086  (3.898)**
sint_7    -0.015  -0.394    -0.110  (1.793)*    0.033  0.525    -0.086  (3.96)** 
sint_8    -0.017  -0.937    -0.010  -0.497    0.020  0.536    0.000  -0.078 
divis    -0.009  -1.462    0.015  (2.707)**   -0.004  -0.256    0.000  0.766 
d_rad    0.017  0.651    0.025  1.407    -0.050  -1.473    0.002  1.070 
lit    -0.051  (2.429)**    0.031  1.410    0.039  0.910    -0.002  -1.042 
no_memb    -0.004  -1.438    0.001  0.298    0.019  (3.074)**    0.000  0.884 
HRinDis    -0.027  -1.131    -0.004  -0.165    0.080  (1.696)*    0.001  0.883 
transit    0.008  0.538    -0.007  -0.301    -0.025  -0.647    0.000  -0.080 
transp    0.067  (2.906)**    -0.048  (2.091)**   -0.010  -0.203    0.001  0.506 
csp_ua    0.010  (3.312)**    0.004  0.830    -0.019  (1.963)*    -0.001  (2.626)**
msp_pop    -0.006  (2.338)**    0.006  (1.83)*    -0.006  -0.673    0.000  (2.283)**
price_2    -0.320  -1.475    0.039  .    0.116  .    0.001  . 
price_3    -0.007  .    0.069  1.308    -0.026  .    0.000  . 
price_4    0.054  .    0.068  .    -0.406  (2.988)**    0.002  . 
price_5    0.003  .    0.004  .    0.013  .    -0.038  (2.164)**
price2_2    -0.001  -0.198    0.000  .    0.000  .    0.000  . 
price2_3    0.000  .    0.002  (2.536)**   -0.001  .    0.000  . 
price2_4    -0.001  .    -0.001  .    0.009  (3.426)**    0.000  . 
price2_5    0.000  .    0.000  .    0.000  .    0.000  -0.600 
cspr_ia2    0.024  1.422    -0.003  .    -0.009  .    0.000  . 
cspr_ia3    0.001  .    -0.009  (2.209)**   0.003  .    0.000  . 
cspr_ia4    -0.003  .    -0.004  .    0.021  (2.029)**    0.000  . 
cspr_ia5    0.000  .    0.000  .    -0.001  .    0.003  (2.022)**
time_2    0.010  1.012    -0.001  .    -0.004  .    0.000  . 
time_3    0.000  .    -0.004  -0.724    0.001  .    0.000  . 
time_4    0.000  .    0.000  .    0.003  0.323    0.000  . 
time_5    0.000  .    0.000  .    0.000  .    0.001  (2.245)**
_cons    0.050  0.238    -0.475  (2.037)**   0.140  0.305    0.030  1.395 
                                      
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.                   
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level.              
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Table 17: Results: Wald test 
Variable  chi2  df  P>chi2 
       
idd  18.584  4  0.001 
female  3.072  4  0.546 
edu_pr1  13.349  4  0.010 
edu_pr2  16.197  4  0.003 
edu_more  1782.272  4  0.000 
mnth_cns  8.456  4  0.076 
wage  5.142  4  0.273 
sint_1  23.295  4  0.000 
sint_2  19.801  4  0.001 
sint_3  4.431  4  0.351 
sint_4  12.065  4  0.017 
sint_5  7.929  4  0.094 
sint_6  4337.187  4  0.000 
sint_7  3411.601  4  0.000 
sint_8  1.229  4  0.873 
divis  9.227  4  0.056 
d_rad  4.729  4  0.316 
lit  8.642  4  0.071 
no_memb  11.506  4  0.021 
HRinDis  4.310  4  0.366 
transit  0.897  4  0.925 
transp  12.356  4  0.015 
csp_ua  17.962  4  0.001 
msp_pop  18.223  4  0.001 
price_2  2.275  1  0.131 
price_3  1.744  1  0.187 
price_4  9.082  1  0.003 
price_5  4.483  1  0.034 
price2_2  0.039  1  0.843 
price2_3  6.484  1  0.011 
price2_4  12.052  1  0.001 
price2_5  0.383  1  0.536 
cspr_ia2  2.108  1  0.147 
cspr_ia3  5.126  1  0.024 
cspr_ia4  4.139  1  0.042 
cspr_ia5  3.939  1  0.047 
time_2  1.035  1  0.309 
time_3  0.518  1  0.472 
time_4  0.105  1  0.746 
time_5  5.600  1  0.018 
Ho: All coefficients associated with given variables are 0. 
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